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GenderHow much economic mobility is there across generations in a poor, primarily rural, economy? How much do
intergenerational linkages contribute to current inequality? We address these questions using original survey
data on Senegal that include a sub-household measure of consumption for cells within the household. While in-
tergenerational linkages are evident, we ﬁnd a relatively high degree of mobility across generations, associated
with the shift from farm to non-farm sectors and greater economic activity of women. Male-dominated bequests
of land and housing bring little gain to consumption and play little role in explaining inequality, though they have
important effects on sector of activity. Inheritance of non-land assets and the education and occupation of parents
(especially the mother) and their choices about children's schooling are more important to adult welfare than
property inheritance. Signiﬁcant gender inequality in consumption is evident, though it is almost entirely expli-
cable in terms of factors such as education and (non-land) inheritance. There are a number of other pronounced
gender differences, with intergenerational linkages appearing through the mother rather than the father.
© 2014 Published by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction
Traditional agrarian economies are often thought to have limited
intergenerational mobility and (hence) highly persistent inequality.
However, while intergenerational mobility has long been a subject of
research in developed countries, the issue has received relatively little at-
tention in poor, primarily agrarian, economies.1 In particular, we know
very little about howmuch of the inequality seen in such economies is as-
sociated with the linkages across generations through inheritance of as-
sets and occupations, bequests, parental choices on schooling and
parental characteristics. Inheritance of agricultural land—the main non-
labor factor of production—is probably the ﬁrst mechanism one thinks
of for the intergenerational transmission of inequality in such settings.
However, education couldwell be at least as important, especially in facil-
itating diversiﬁcation into more remunerative non-farm activities. Are
these economies characterized by a high degree of intergenerationalants at the UNU-WIDER confer-
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rican Economies, University of
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n).
ith seminal books by Blau andpersistence of poverty and afﬂuence, or is there churning associated
with successes and failures for adults taking upneweconomic opportuni-
ties? How much do intergenerational linkages and parental characteris-
tics matter to adult living standards and economic activities?
We also know very little about inter-personal inequality in living
standards, including between men and women. This reﬂects a long-
standing limitation of the available survey data on consumption, name-
ly that these data are almost invariably collected at the household level.
Inequality and poverty measures typically assume equality within
households. Since adult women are generally married, it is difﬁcult to
separate their own welfare from that of their husbands on the basis of
household data. However, gender dimensions of inequality are consid-
ered important. Male control over land and its inheritance has long
been an issue in development studies.2 Maternal education and work
experience might also be expected to play a role. It has often been ar-
gued that maternal education has an important inﬂuence on children's
health, nutritional status and schooling.3 There might also be implica-
tions for adult welfare and economic activity, though there has been
less research on this intergenerational linkage.2 In the context of land rights in Africa see Gray and Kevane (1999) for an overview of
the issues.
3 See, for example, Haveman andWolfe (1995), and Hill and King (1995). The causal in-
terpretation of these correlations can be questioned given the possibility of inter-
generationally correlated latent factors; see Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002). Dumas
and Lambert (2011) ﬁnd that maternal education plays a weaker role once properly
instrumented.
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mobility and the transmission of inter-personal inequality in a poor,
primarily rural, economy. The central question we address is how im-
portant various intergenerational linkages are to consumption inequal-
ity among adults. The paper takes advantage of an unusual new data set
for Senegal thatmeasures consumption at a relatively disaggregated level
within the household, so that we can build a measure that is closer to in-
dividual adult consumption than is usually available, to be matched with
individualized data on inheritance and various control variables. The data
also allow us to distinguish intergenerational linkages by gender.
Wemodel ourmeasure as a functionof various intergenerational link-
ages, including land inheritance, education and parental characteristics
(including occupation), with controls for other individual characteristics.
In keeping with past literature, we treat inheritance as conditionally
exogenous (conditional on our controls).4 However, that assumption
can be questioned. While we have limited scope for identiﬁcation we
offer one test of robustness to relaxing exogeneity, under the assumption
that the father's death more than two years before is excludable from
the consumption regressions, i.e., that the past death only matters via
inheritance.
We use our model of consumption to attribute overall consumption
inequality to these explanatory factors. Here we use the Shorrocks's
(1982) “natural decomposition,” as adapted to a linear regression func-
tion following Fields (2003). Using the same regression models and
identiﬁcation strategy, the paper also examines the role of intergenera-
tional linkages in occupational and geographic mobility between par-
ents and their offspring.
We ﬁnd negligible consumption gain from land inheritance. Other
sources of intergenerational linkages such as parental education and
occupation, as well as parental investments in children's education, ap-
pear to play a much bigger role in raising consumption. These factors
also emerge as signiﬁcant determinants of the intergenerational transi-
tion from farm to non-farm activity and geographic mobility—both
likely to be linked with higher consumption. Land inheritance makes
it more likely that one will remain a farmer and stay in rural areas. In
general, formal schooling brings higher returns in consumption terms
than the inheritance of physical assets. Nevertheless, it is only for men
that education is correlated with a higher probability of engaging in
non-farm activities and moving away from the parental location of res-
idence. Overall, the inheritance of physical assets (land and housing)
plays little role in explaining consumption inequality, even among
rural households.
These results lead us to question the traditional model of a develop-
ing economy with imperfect credit markets in which privately-owned
land is a marketable asset generating an income stream exclusively for
the designated individual owner. But our results are easier to under-
stand in the light of richer models of rural economies with limited mar-
ket development.We already know from the literature (in anthropology
as well as economics) that market failures and non-market allocation
processes play an important role in how land is used. Agricultural land
inheritance in much of Africa is typically ﬁltered through customary
land allocation processes involving kinship or community groups.5
Inheritance signals a change in responsibility, such that the recipient
of land inherits obligations as well as an asset, and it is an asset that is
not easily monetized to support other productive investments.
The impacts of inheritance will naturally reﬂect how the “dynastic
family” allocates its resources, given the market and institutional envi-
ronment. In principle at least, the extended family has the ability to
attain any desired distribution of consumption, independently of the
formal assignment of ownership rights. Indeed, it is an open question4 Indeed, inheritance has been used as an instrumental variable for current wealth and
land rights in explaining various dimensions of current living standards and land produc-
tivity. Examples include Akresh et al. (2010) and Besley (1995).
5 For an overview of the issues see Shipton and Goheen (1992). Also see the discussion
in Platteau (2000).in this setting whether there is any net impact on the inheritor of a
land bequest within the family.
Our results suggest that other mechanisms for the intergenerational
transmission of inequality—notably related to parental education in-
cluding assortative matching, and children's schooling—are more im-
portant than land inheritance in explaining interpersonal economic
welfare and economic activities. Even in very poor settings, parental
background can inﬂuence the schooling, expectations, and general life
chances, of children in ways that matter to the realized living standards
of adults. Our results support this view, echoing otherﬁndings in the lit-
erature.6 Some degree of intergenerational correlation in occupational
choices can be expected, for which we ﬁnd supportive evidence.
In the following section, we begin by discussing what is currently
known about intergenerational linkages in developing economies.
We then describe our data for Senegal and the setting in Section 3.
Section 4 brieﬂy examines occupational mobility. The methods of anal-
ysis and our empirical results on the intergenerational effects on con-
sumption, economic activity and geographic mobility are discussed in
the next two sections, while Section 7 explores various tests of robust-
ness. Section 8 examines the implications for understanding inter-
personal inequality and a ﬁnal section concludes.
2. Intergenerational linkages in a developing economy
The role of parental choices in creating intergenerational linkages
has received some attention in the literature. A still small but growing
literature has studied how parents go about assigning various assets
among their children in developing countries. Estudillo et al. (2001)
and Quisumbing et al. (2004) explore the parental allocation decision
over land transfers and investments in education, from the point of
view of gender equity. Using data for the Philippines, Sumatra and
Ghana, they argue that parents aim to equalize economic well-being
across their offspring, which may well result in unequal inheritance of
speciﬁc assets given gender differences in returns. Intergenerational
transfers thus reﬂect parents' expectations of returns to land and
human capital assets and allowmultiple sources of linkages and substi-
tution. La Ferrara andMilazzo (2012) also document how parents strat-
egize and substitute land and education transfers to their offspring in
Ghana. They examine how a reform in inheritance law alters the trans-
mission of human capital investments and land from parents to sons
and daughters. As posited by the authors, the relaxation of matrilineal
rules of descent results in a reallocation away from schooling and to-
ward land transfers that is more pronounced for boys and only evident
formatrilineal (Akan) households. Akan sons are also found to be signif-
icantly more likely to be farmers post reform.
Although not our immediate focus in this paper, a strand of the liter-
ature has also focused on spousal inheritance at divorce or widowhood,
and impacts thereof (Cooper and Bird, 2012; Kumar and Quisumbing,
2012a, 2012b; Peterman, 2012). For example, Kumar and Quisumbing
(2012b) investigate the impact of changes in Family Law and land
registration procedures favorable to women in Ethiopia on married
women's perceptions of asset and child custody allocations in the
event of divorce. Reform induced changes in attitudes are found not
only to have increased women's well-being but also led to intergenera-
tional linkages through increased investments in child schooling.
Intergenerational transmission mechanisms are also emphasized
in the literature documenting the role of property ownership, most
prominently land, in enhancing women's status and bargaining power
within the householdwith spillover effects on child human and physical6 Estudillo et al. (2001) emphasize the combination of both land inheritance and
schooling in the inter-generational transmission of wealth in the rural Philippines.
Lesorogol et al. (2011) ﬁnd that the current wealth of Kenyan pastoralists is correlated
with parental wealth and formal education but not with livestock inheritance. Ferreira
and Gignoux (2010) ﬁnd that family background characteristics are an important source
of unequal opportunities in Latin America. Dumas and Lambert (2011) ﬁnd that parental
education has a strong effect on child schooling in Senegal.
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2003). Such female control over assets is often obtained through paren-
tal bequests.
There has been a lacuna of research on intergenerational mobility
in Africa. Indeed,we knowof only one paper addressing the issue, focus-
ing on the intergenerational mobility between agricultural and non-
agricultural occupations in ﬁve countries, namely Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana,
Guinea, Madagascar and Uganda. In explaining the revealed variance
in intergenerational occupational mobility across the countries,
Bossuroy and Cogneau (2013) emphasize educational immobility
in Madagascar and the pronounced duality in the spatial distribution
of employment in the other countries, which the authors link to the
countries' respective colonial histories.
The assignment of land ownership is naturally expected to play a
role in any rural economyand this has been a theme in the development
literature. Private ownership of land (with or without a formal title)
is typically viewed as a form of private wealth, which is expected to
deliver exclusively to its owner an income stream derived from the
productive capacity of the owned land. In the context of a mainly rural
market-based economy, one thus expects land ownership to play an
important role in determining the individual's standard of living. Land
inheritance is one way of acquiring ownership. Thus land inheritance
should be important to the intergenerational transmission of inequality
and also to economic activity, including diversiﬁcation into non-farm
production, especially when credit is unavailable. Development policy
debates often focus on inheritance laws, especially reforms aiming to
improve women's rights.7
Taxation policies have also emphasized land ownership as a basis
for assigning taxes, including in poor rural economies. Taxes on land
are found in almost all countries. Also, transfers and various direct inter-
ventions are often targeted according to land holding, deﬁned by own-
ership. These include policies aiming to redistribute land itself. Tenure
security is traditionally deﬁned in terms of individual titles of private
ownership. There have been many efforts (often supported by external
development assistance) to foster individual ownership through land
titling, with expected beneﬁts to the government in efforts to tax land
value, and also expected gains in both efﬁciency (promoting land
investment through greater tenure security and access to credit) and
equity (notably in promoting women's empowerment).8
However, it is far from clear how relevant this standard model of
land as a form of marketable and productive wealth is to poor rural
economies where land markets are thin or non-existent and imperfect
(and asymmetric) information and long-established social institutions
play an important role in how land is allocated and used. The beneﬁts
from efforts to foster individual ownership titles are known to be uncer-
tain when individual titling is introduced in an indigenous system of
tenure, which is probably why the evidence that such efforts have had
their expected beneﬁts appears to be mixed.9
Inheritance of the family farm may well bring enhanced individual
power within the family—interpretable as a non-pecuniary gain—but
it undoubtedly also comeswith responsibilities and constraints. Past ob-
servations about African agriculture lead one to question the extent of
the gains to the inheritor of land, who may have to take on various
obligations. These naturally include responsibility for the family as an7 Deininger et al. (2013), Hallward-Driemeier and Gajigo (2011), Kumar and
Quisumbing (2012b) and Roy (2011) ﬁnd evidence that legal reforms related to property
rights havebrought gains towomen (theﬁrst two in Ethiopia and the last two in India). On
a less positive note, Anderson and Genicot (2014) ﬁnd that such reforms have increased
within household conﬂict to the point of leading to increased suicide rates for both men
and women.
8 On the expected land productivity gains from titling see Barrows and Roth (1990),
Besley (1995), Deininger (2003) and Feder and Noronha (1987).
9 Ensminger (1997) discusses the conﬂict between private property rights introduced
in the context of customary norms and institutions in Kenya. Deininger (2003) reviews
the evidence. A recent example of a study pointing to success of land titling in raising pro-
ductivity is Holden et al. (2009); an example ﬁnding little or no impact is Jacoby and
Minten (2007).economic unit, but they may also extend well beyond the immediate,
and even the extended, family. Anthropologists have emphasized the
social responsibilities that come with acquired wealth such as through
land ownership. As Shipton and Goheen (1992, p. 311) note with refer-
ence to land in rural Africa, “Rights often entail duties. Cultivation and
grazing rights may entail obligations to share farm products beyond
the domestic group.” Similarly, with reference to the Luo people of
Kenya, Shipton (1992, p. 361) argues that “Rights of individuals [over
land] were not thought sacrosanct, but instead they interlocked with
the rights of others, and overlapped with those of families and wider
groups.” Individual responsibilities within a village economy are often
embedded in broader social ties, interpretable as means of enforcing
cooperative equilibria that bring collective beneﬁts (Platteau, 2000).
Whether such responsibilities come with a consumption incentive
is unclear on a priori grounds, given that there are also likely to be
non-pecuniary beneﬁts and costs.
In much of Africa, the local state and community governance are
involved in land allocation, as are traditional, customary, non-market
kin-based allocation processes. In particular, land that is not kept in
use and looked after appropriately risks appropriation by the communi-
ty in many rural economies: the lineage or household head is thus in
charge of making sure this doesn't happen so as to insure the family's
long-term security. Further, membership of an (potentially large)
extended family often conveys rights to work the family's land holding
and/or share in its bounty. These arrangements can mean that individ-
ual land ownership conveys obligations and associated costs to the
owner, especially if he or she is also the head of household. As noted
by Ensminger (1997) “Lineages are not just kinfolk…they cooperate
in labor, risk management, and investment. Fundamental to the high
level of trust and cooperation that such systems enjoy are basic guaran-
tees of subsistence in the short run – through access to land – and the
long run through inheritance of that land” (p. 165). One cannot even
rule out consumption losses to the inheritor. Without a land market it
will be hard for the recipient to “cash in” the land to ﬁnance some
other (non-farm) investment. The lack of a landmarketmay then create
occupational stickiness, whereby the bequest of land inhibits the
recipient's transition to non-farm activities (though possibly enhancing
the scope for such a transition by others in the family). Land-market fail-
uresmay even entail that the (say) eldest sonwho gets the land and the
responsibilities of being the head of household ends up trapped in farm-
ing,while his siblings see newopportunities for diversiﬁcation into non-
farm activities.
Indeed, inheriting the land but without the responsibilities of head-
shipmay allow the recipient to leave the land to take up some non-farm
activity. As already noted, givenweakmarket and governmental institu-
tions for risk-sharing, the family farm is known to serve a social security
role in traditional societies. The recipient of the land bequest may then
effectively transfer the right to other family members (the mother,
spouse, and children). Their security (at someminimal level) is thus as-
sured, and the son is free to seek work or start an enterprise elsewhere,
such as in an urban area. However, one can also imagine situations
in which non-market factors in the allocation of command over the
product of land can discourage agriculture, even for the household
head, in favor of other (non-farm) activities possibly outside the village
economy. This can happen when the non-market allocation rules re-
quire a sharing of the product of land, and that the sharing rule entails
that inheriting extra land reduces the marginal product of the owner's
effort in farming relative to other uses of labor time, thus generating a
substitution toward non-farm activities. This is a distortion to inter-
sectoral allocation, in the sense that marginal products of labor become
unequal between activities. In principle, such an inefﬁciency could be
avoided if the family is well informed about other (non-farm) income
sources, so allowing sharing rules based on total income.
Finally, it is worth underlining that land inheritance can be accom-
panied by learning within kinship groups—a source of speciﬁc human
capital that may play an important role in the welfare gains from
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in developing countries are characterized by a high degree of farm-
speciﬁc knowledge, accumulated through experience farming the
same land. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) have emphasized the role
of family-speciﬁc information in explaining intergenerational and
intra-household land transfers, including inheritance; they ﬁnd support
for the claim that speciﬁc-knowledge about the family farmmeans that
land is kept within the family rather than being sold. This could also
explain why land markets are often thin or non-existent and also why
the extended family is so common in poor rural economies, given that
the older generation will have accumulated greater knowledge about
the family farm. As long as the extended family can share knowledge
there will be little economic loss at the death of the head of the house-
hold, though one can imagine circumstances (including unanticipated
deaths) when that is not the case.
We have seen that in the context of a poor rural economy, and in the
African context more speciﬁcally, land inheritance may be a mixed
blessing. The same is true of the other main intergenerational linkage,
namely parental investments in their children's education. It is well un-
derstood that the parental decision to favor one son (say) with extra
schooling comes with an implicit (and sometimes quite explicit) con-
tract for that son to share a steady stream of his subsequent earnings.
These arrangements, and the redistributive pressures on economically
successful household members, as synthetized by Platteau (2006), are
thought to be common in Africa and there is supportive anecdotal
evidence for Senegal (Boltz and Villar, 2014). The son's own consump-
tion gain from schooling is then reduced according to how much is to
be sent home, or shared within the larger family group if the son
remains resident. (Identifying the individual consumption gain in this
case may also require data on consumption within the household.)
The upshot of these observations is that inheritance of land and
educational attainments can have ambiguous effects on welfare and
economic activities. The linkages may well be quite weak. The rest of
this paper will address these issues empirically using an unusual data
set for Senegal.3. Setting and data
The data used here come from an original survey entitled Pauvreté
et Structure Familiale (Poverty and Family Structure, henceforth PSF)
conducted in Senegal in 2006/2007. The PSF survey stems from the
cooperation between a team of French researchers and the National
Statistical Agency of Senegal.10 The survey is described in detail in
De Vreyer et al. (2008).
The PSF covers a sample of over 1800 households spread over 150
clusters drawn randomly from the census districts so as to insure a
nationally representative sample. About 1750 household records can
be exploited, covering 14,450 individuals. The survey describes a popu-
lation of which the majority (57%) live in rural areas, 48% are male and
95% are Muslim—statistics that accord well with other sources (World
Bank, 2009). Despite more than half of the country's close to 12.5 mil-
lion inhabitants in 2009 being rural, the contribution of agriculture to
GDP amounts to only 18%. Like other African countries, Senegal has
seen considerable population urbanization; at the time of independence
in 1960 rural areas were the home of 77% of the population. Urbaniza-
tion over time is evident in the survey in that among those adults
who had a father in rural areas, 22% now live in urban areas. A similar
percentage of those whose mother lived in rural areas also do so.10 Momar B. Sylla and Matar Gueye of the Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la
Démographie of Senegal (ANSD) on the one hand and Philippe De Vreyer (University of
Paris-Dauphine and IRD-DIAL) Sylvie Lambert (PSE) and Abla Saﬁr (now with the World
Bank) designed the survey. The data collection was conducted by the ANSD thanks to
the funding of the IDRC (International Development Research Center), INRA Paris and
CEPREMAP.Senegalese households are large, with slightly more than eight
members on average in the PSF. The families are typically multigenera-
tional and extended both horizontally and vertically, with 36% of house-
hold members that are neither the head, nor one of his wives or
children. Two thirds of households include such “extended” family
members. Polygamous unions are common, with 24% of married men
and 37% of married women engaged in such unions. Most of these com-
prise a husband and two wives (only 20% of polygamous unions have
more than two wives). We ﬁnd that 31% of polygamous men have
non-cohabiting wives. In half of these cases, the husband is either con-
sidered the head of both households, or of one, while one of the wives
is considered head of the other household. In the other half, a married
polygamous woman lives in a separate household headed by a relative
(mainly her father, brother or son).
In addition to the usual information on individual characteristics, the
survey collected details on each household's structure and budgetary
arrangements. To best reﬂect intra-household structure and resource
allocation, each household was divided into groups or “cells” according
to the following rules: the head of household and unaccompanied de-
pendent members, such as his widowed parent or his children whose
mothers do not live in the same household, are grouped together. Any
unmarried brothers of the head would also be considered in his cell.
Each wife of the head and her children and any other dependents
then form separate cells. Other women with children or other depen-
dents and whose husbands are not present, are also considered cell
heads. The same goes for any other family nucleus such as a married
child of the household headwith his/her spouse and children, or a sister
of the household's head residing in the household with her children
(after divorce or while her husband looks for a job). This disaggregation
emerged from ﬁeld interviews as being the relevant way to split the
household into its component groups. Enumerators saw this as a natural
way to divide households and had no difﬁculty collecting the data
accordingly.
Consumption expenditures are recorded in several parts: ﬁrst all
common expenditures are collected (housing, electricity bills etc.).
Food expenditures are compiled based on a detailed account of who
shareswhichmeal and howmuchmoney is speciﬁcally used to prepare
the meal. These are the “DQ” or “dépenses quotidiennes” — the name
the Senegalese give to the amount ofmoney awomanhas at her dispos-
al to buy fresh ingredients for the meals of the day. Next individual
consumption is collected at the group level (such as clothing, mobile
phone, transportation, and food outside the home expenditures). Finally,
expenditures that are shared between several cells are collected.
A measure of per capita consumption can then be constructed at
the cell level allowing us to identify unequal consumption levels within
households. Subgroups also emerge that take some or all of their meals
separately (in 17% of households), thus widening the possibility for
differences in nutritional intake among household members. Thanks
to these data we can construct a relatively individualized measure of
consumption, which is almost never available in household surveys.
This is what we will use to better assess individual economic welfare.
The measure we use here is the amount of expenditures speciﬁc to
the cell and not shared with any other cell plus the cell's imputed
share of the household's joint expenditures.
Wewill restrict our study to individuals who are heads of their cells.
For consumption purposes, they are assumed to be the decision makers
at the cell level.11Weare therefore leftwith 4401observations, ofwhich
56.8% are women. 75% of cell heads are household heads or the head's
spouse, 7.5% are daughters of the head, and 3% are daughters-in-law.
The average number of cells per household is 2.51. The range is from 1
to 12; 81% of the sampled households have more than one cell.11 Note that this sample is not representative of the adult population in Senegal. For ex-
ample, among adult women, wives of household heads are over-represented, while
daughters of the head are under-represented. It is nevertheless representative of the adult
population that has at least one dependent.
13 If someone dies without having expressed a choice of inheritance regime, the default
is supposed to be modern law. Nevertheless, if it can be proved that during his or her life,
the defunct always behaved according to Islamic precepts, Islamic law can be applied. As a
result, Islamic inheritance laws prevail almost universally.
14
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about 276,000 CFA francs per year, which corresponds to nearly $925
US in 2005 PPP exchange rates for consumption, or about $2.50 per
day. When looking at total expenditures, inequalities within the house-
hold are evident: the ratio between the expenditures of the richest and
the poorest cell within a household can be as high as 18 and is still equal
to 4.4 after trimming off the 5% most unequal households. Computing
an inequality index for the distribution of cash expenditures in the pop-
ulation, we ﬁnd a Gini index of 59.8% if we attribute to each person the
average per capita consumption level in his or her household. The index
is 62.7% if instead each individual is attributed the per capita consump-
tion in his cell (i.e. the sum of the per capita expenditures speciﬁc to the
cell and of the cell's share of common household expenditures, distrib-
uted on a per capita basis within the cell). The Gini index of inequality
in the distribution of the cell-speciﬁc component of cash expenditures
(ignoring the joint consumption within the household) is 77.9%.
The consumption data also reveal a sizeable gender gap. Regressing
the log of cell consumption on gender, the regression coefﬁcient (the
difference in mean log consumption) is 0.57 and is signiﬁcant at the
1% level (t = 14.92).
Importantly for the purpose of our paper, these data include
information on parental characteristics and inheritance. If the parent
has died, the survey asked whether he or she left any inheritance and
then, for each person, whether they obtained any inheritance in the
form of land, housing, money, durable goods or productive capital. No
valuation of these inheritances was obtained.12 In particular, we do
not know how much land was inherited. For this reason we use a
dummy variable indicatingwhether landwas inherited or not (and like-
wise for the other forms of inheritance). This may affect the size and
signiﬁcance of our estimates, although the endogeneity concerns
(which we return to) would clearly be even greater using amounts of
inherited land rather than simply the incidence of inheritance.
On paper, agricultural land is allocated through local community
level administrative processes in Senegal. Since 1964, most of the land
(between 95 and 98%) has been owned by the state and part of what
is called the national domain (Boone, 2007; Caveriviére, 1986). Alloca-
tion and use are reserved for those who belong to the local community
or kinship group (Boone, 2007). Land use rights are attributed by local
land committees on the basis of needs and capacity to farm. This land
cannot be sold and in theory cannot be bequeathed either. As a result,
rural land markets are very weak. A land reform aiming to strengthen
the security of use rights and to facilitate market transfers was
attempted in 2004. Following extensive consultations with rural pro-
ducers and civil society, the Law for Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral Development
(LOASP) was ﬁnally enacted in 2004 but its land component was
dropped due to a lack of consensus. The fear was that communities
would be at risk of being dispossessed of lands not yet formally attribut-
ed by the local land committees. Land reform is still being discussed.
The unequal access to land across gender is also a source of concern
in Senegal. The legal system has recently changed to try to reduce this
gender inequality. The constitution of 2001 ﬁnally granted women the
right to own land. They have only been allowed to be on the local land
committees in charge of the attribution of use rights since May 2010.
Hence, in the past, women very rarely received land through this alloca-
tion mechanism. There has been little progress in the last decade. In its
2011 report on land policy in West Africa, the Economic Commission
for Africa still emphasizes Senegalese women's very poor access to
land (UNECA, 2011).
Despite the legal setting described above, the reality on the ground is
that land bequests are common. Our survey data indicate that, in our
sample of cell heads, 32% of men and 43% of those whose fathers have
died, but only 17% (28%) of women, report that they inherited land.12 Pilot tests indicated that this is information that households were ﬁrmly unwilling to
reveal, probably because inheritance rules are well established and contrary to what is
universally asserted, are not in actual fact adhered to.Looking at all forms of inheritance (including housing, durables,
money and productive assets) 54% of men in the sample inherited
something, while 38% of women did so. In practice, heirs are given
priority over land use rights relative to other potential users. Hence,
inheritance of paternal lineage land is an important means of access to
ownership. We observe very few changes in land ownership over the
ﬁve years preceding the survey. Nevertheless, half of the cases where
the amount of land owned increased are due to inheritance.
Several inheritance laws that give different treatment to women co-
exist in Senegal. Individuals can choose which law to abide by before
their death.13 The French inspired (“modern”) system of inheritance
dictates that wealth be shared equally among children, whatever their
gender. By contrast, Islamic inheritance law (which is by far the most
common choice) limits the inheritance of daughters to half of that of
sons.14 In addition, entrenched tradition favors sons for inheriting land
(with a small exception in Basse Casamance where there is slightly
more access to land for women, due to strong tradition in women-
dominated rice cultivation). Since daughters typically move to their
husband's abode, they are supposedly compensated by their brothers
with money or other forms of wealth such as their imputed yearly
share of the harvest, for what would have otherwise been their share
of land inheritance.
Inheritance is not always shared immediately after a father's death.
The heirs may carry on living in the parental house, using the parental
land, without a formal sharing having taken place. During this period –
which can last for years – the heirs who do not partake in the use right
(typically daughters) because they live somewhere else, are not com-
pensated. Although they are, in practice, owners of their share, they can-
not cash it in. In this paper, we do not consider pre-mortem gifts as
inheritance. These do not appear to be prevalent. Sons may receive
somemoney to help pay the bride price and to settle down upon getting
married. However, such transfers are not taken into account in the shar-
ing of inheritance.
As can be seen in Table 1, 72% of the heads of cells report that their
deceased father left some form of inheritance to his children and 32%
of them received land bequests. In contrast, only 22% of the heads of
cells indicate that their deceased mothers transmitted any inheritance,
while 2% received land. Fathers bequeath their wealth to their sons
more often than to their daughters, particularly when it is in the form
of land. Mothers treated sons and daughters roughly equally in this
respect, although they also favored sons with the little land they
bequeathed. The Statistical Addendum provides probits for inheritance
(both land and any form of inheritance) with a wide range of controls
for individual and parental characteristics. Even with these controls,
we continue to ﬁnd that men are more likely to inherit than women.
Conditional on the controls, being male adds 0.11 to 0.13 to the condi-
tional probability of receiving any inheritance, while it adds 0.08 to
the probability of inheriting land.
The data reveal that very few women (about 2%) have any land to
transfer to their heirs when they die, while more than a third of men
leave some land. Note that the large discrepancy between the above
noted 17% of women reporting that they inherited land and the 2% leav-
ing land is largely explained by the fact that women's land use rights are
highly revocable when their marital situations change. A woman loses
access to her family land when she marries, and often loses access to
her husband's land in the event of widowhood or divorce. She may
well also lose control over any land she has inherited over her lifetime.Although some ethnic groups in Senegal are ofmatrilineal tradition (such as the Lebu–
Wolof–Serere in the country's north and center), such traditions have mostly been
displaced by Islam when it comes to material inheritance (Sow, 1992). As a result, inher-
itance from an adult male other than the father (such as a maternal uncle or foster parent
for example) is now a rare occurrence.
Table 1
Inheritance, by gender.
Among individual heads of cells whose father or mother is dead Men Women All t-Test of the difference
(women-men)
Father has left any form of inheritance 75.34% (987) 68.26% (974) 71.65% −4.12
Father has transmitted land to this person 40.61% (588) 24.74% (410) 32.14% −9.58
Mother has left any form of inheritance 21.23% (173) 22.49% (190) 21.87% 0.62
Mother has transmitted land to this person 2.62 (38) 1.75% (29) 2.16% −1.67
Note: number of observations in brackets. Estimates are based on sampled cell heads' reporting inheritance from their deceased mother or father.
15 Our hunch is that this group is made up primarily of marabouts (religious leaders),
and others engaged in traditional positions or as traditional social leaders such as griots
(village story tellers), traditional healers, circumcisers andmidwives. Many of these occu-
pations are either caste (such as griot) or lineage based (such as Marabout), but not
gender-based.
16 Interviewers were instructed to collect information on parents' last held occupations
prior to retirement. Older adults do not typically say they are ‘retired’ or are not described
this way unless they were public servants and receive a pension which is relatively rare.
Theymore typically refer to themselves as being in the occupation they spent the last part
of their working lives in. This can pose a problem to measures of occupational mobility
since it is not uncommon for oldermen to return to their natal village and become farmers.
332 S. Lambert et al. / Journal of Development Economics 110 (2014) 327–344In addition, she has no decision power over its transmission: a deceased
woman's land is ﬁrst returned to her husband (or his family) or to her
brothers, and eventually transferred to children only at their father's
death.
In these respects, Senegal is not unusual within Sub-Saharan Africa
(Cooper, 2008, 2010). The rights of women to land are mainly indirect
(Platteau et al., 2000) and contingent on marital status. As a daughter
living in her father's household, a woman will work on the family land
and eventually obtain use rights to a plot. As a wife, she'll work on the
land of her husband's family and might also have use rights on her
personal plot. If she is in neither of these positions, she simply won't
have access to land. This in part explains the high remarriage rate
following widowhood or divorce.
The complex nature of households in Senegal – reﬂecting house-
holds' extended, multigenerational character, the prevalence of polyga-
my, as well as of widowhood and divorce followed by widespread
remarriage, and of child fostering – together with inheritance customs,
means that it is important to control for household structure in examin-
ing intergenerational mobility and interpersonal inequality outcomes.
For example, a child's inheritance will be a function not only of his
gender but also of the gender and number of competing siblings as
well as whether they share the same father and mother, or just the
same mother, or the same father. The interaction of gender and birth
ordermay also play a determining role.Wewill control for these factors
in our regressions.
Despite net primary schooling rates now reaching 78%, the average
education in the adult population is still low. In the sample of cell
heads we are using (hence excluding the youngest cohorts who have
beneﬁtted from the expansion of schooling), 30% have some formal
(non-Koranic) education. This is the case for only 11% of those living
in rural areas (47% in urban areas). In addition, in rural areas, 75% of
people with some education never went beyond primary schooling.
The gender gap is also quite sizeable: only 25% of women have ever
had any formal schooling, while 35% of men have. The gap increases
with the level of education. Less than 40% of women with some educa-
tion reached at least the secondary level, while this is true for half of the
men who attended a formal school. Women in rural areas cumulate
both disadvantages and only 8% of them have ever been to a formal
school. In all cases our education variable is deﬁned as a dummy for
whether the individual has some formal education.
A statistical addendum is available from the authors providing
summary statistics on the main PSF variables.
4. Occupational mobility
The ﬁrst form of intergenerational linkage we consider is in occupa-
tions. Do sons of farmers tend to be farmers? What about daughters?
Are there links with mothers' occupation? Information was collected
on the occupation and education of each parent for each individual.
The last place of the mother and father's residence is also known
allowing us to determine whether an individual resides in the same
village as his parents.
Occupation has been classiﬁed under four categories: agriculture,
non-agriculture, other, or inactive. ‘Other’ contains individuals who
reported that they were active but not employers, wage workers, or
self-employed. As their activities are not known to us, we are unableto classify them into farm/non-farm and so have kept themas a separate
group.15 Inactive includes “housewives,” students, and those unable to
work due, for example, to disability. Table 2 gives the joint distribution
of occupations for parents and their children, formen andwomen.16We
ﬁnd that 36% of individuals had a father working in agriculture, while
22% declare that their mother was in agriculture. Note that women
who manage a plot of land on the side to make some extra cash (as is
common for Senegalese women in both rural and urban areas) do not
deﬁne themselves as farmers. It is thus likely that mothers were identi-
ﬁed as housewives evenwhen they did amodest amount of agricultural
work, so that those who report being active in agriculture probably
dedicated considerable time to this occupation, suggesting relatively
poor households. When the mother is declared a farmer, in 72% of
the cases, the father is also in farming. More generally, parents' sectors
of activity are highly correlated.
Women have been moving out of an almost exclusive focus on
(or self-identiﬁcation with) household work over time. We ﬁnd that
38% of sampled women were coded as “inactive” but that this was
true of 58% of their mothers. Over one third of those with inactive
mothers went into the non-farm sector, with far fewer (13%) going
into farming. Very fewwomen have amother whose occupation is clas-
siﬁed as “other,” but the reproduction over time is quite strong. Over
half of those women are themselves classiﬁed in other. This is quite un-
derstandable if as we believe, the category consists mostly of traditional
non-farm occupations that are caste or lineage-based (and not gender-
differentiated) and that require skills and possibly reputations built up
and transmitted across generations.
Table 2 suggests considerable intergenerational mobility out of
farming. Only one third of the one third of men whose fathers worked
in agriculture stayed in the sector, though there is somewhat stronger
persistence with respect to mother's sector with 43% of the men (33%
of the women) who declared that their mother was working in agricul-
ture doing so aswell. One explanation for this is that poorer farmhouse-
holds are both more likely to have had a mother in farming and to be
less mobile. Participation in the non-farm sector was more persistent
across generations, with nearly three-quarters of those men whose
fathers worked in the non-farm sector being also recorded as working
in that sector. A signiﬁcant amount of persistence is also apparent
with respect to “other” for mothers and their sons (74% of sons with
mothers in “other”were also classiﬁed that way) as well as their daugh-
ters (53%). There is little occupational stickiness for fathers engaged
in “other” and daughters, although close to half of sons followed in
their footsteps.
How does the persistence in occupations across generations com-
pare to that found in other developing countries? A common measure
Table 2
Sectoral occupational mobility across generations for men and women.
No. observations (% of all individuals) Men Women
Farm Non-farm Inactive Other Total Farm Non-farm Inactive Other Total
Father's occupation
Farm 219 314 28 76 637 229 276 267 121 893
(12.41) (17.79) (1.59) (4.31) (36.09) (9.74) (11.73) (11.35) (5.14) (37.97)
Non-farm 53 421 53 27 554 49 403 358 19 829
(3.00) (23.85) (3.00) (1.53) (31.39) (2.08) (17.13) (15.22) (0.81) (35.25)
Inactive 175 279 50 40 544 107 183 280 41 611
(9.92) (15.81) (2.83) (2.27) (30.82) (4.55) (7.78) (11.90) (1.74) (25.98)
Other 1 10 5 14 30 1 6 6 6 19
(0.06) (0.57) (0.28) (0.79) (1.70) (0.04) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.81)
Total 448 1024 136 157 1765 386 868 911 187 2352
(25.38) (58.02) (7.71) (8.90) (100.00) (16.41) (36.90) (38.73) (7.95) (100.00)
Cramer's V 0.204 0.194
Odds-ratio (farm and non-farm only) 5.54 6.82
Mother's occupation
Farm 154 134 13 50 351 187 173 89 104 553
(8.67) (7.54) (0.73) (2.81) (19.75) (7.97) (7.37) (3.79) (4.43) (23.56)
Non-farm 19 208 20 13 260 22 218 155 14 409
(1.07) (11.71) (1.13) (0.73) (14.63) (0.94) (9.29) (6.60) (0.60) (17.43)
Inactive 268 684 103 58 1113 172 476 652 53 1353
(15.08) (38.49) (5.80) (3.26) (62.63) (7.33) (20.28) (27.78) (2.26) (57.65)
Other 5 7 2 39 53 4 6 5 17 32
(0.28) (0.39) (0.11) (2.19) (2.98) (0.17) (0.26) (0.21) (0.72) (1.36)
Total 446 1033 138 160 1777 385 873 901 188 2347
(25.10) (58.13) (7.77) (9.00) (100.00) (16.40) (37.20) (38.39) (8.01) (100.00)
Cramer's V 0.289 0.265
Odds-ratio (farm and non-farm only) 12.59 10.71
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which has the advantage that it can be compared with similar calcula-
tions for other countries. To help assure comparability with Bossuroy
and Cogneau (2013) we conﬁne our calculations to the odds ratio
given by the ratio of the odds of the son being in the non-farm (NF) sec-
tor when his father was in that sector to the odds of the son having
switched to NFwhen the father was in the farm (F) sector.17 The odds
ratio is then18:
OR ¼ p y ¼ NFð jx ¼ NFÞ= 1−p y ¼ NFð jx ¼ NF½ Þ
p y ¼ NFð jx ¼ FÞ= 1−p y ¼ NFð jx ¼ F½ Þ : ð1Þ
Here p(.) denotes the empirical probability of the term in parenthe-
ses where x= k denotes that the father is in sector k (=NF,F) and y= k
denotes this for the son.
Table 2 gives the results. The OR for fathers and sons of 5.5 might
suggest a relatively high degree of immobility; the odds of being in
the non-farm sector given that your father was in that sector is 5.5
times higher than if your father had been a farmer. However, it turns
out that among the nine developing countries for which results are
reported in Bossuroy and Cogneau (2013), Senegal is the third most
mobile (behind Ghana and Uganda). At the other extreme, India is the
least mobile with an odds ratio of 32, which may well reﬂect occupa-
tional rigidities associated with the caste system.
Bossuroy and Cogneau (2013) only give results for fathers and sons,
but we can repeat the calculation for mothers and daughters and the
cross-effects, as given in Table 2. We ﬁnd that women are less mobile17 Our results are not perfectly comparable with Bossuroy and Cogneau because we ob-
serve the last occupation of the father and not, as they do, the main occupation during
adulthood. As a result, wemight count as farmersmenwho haveworked in the urban for-
mal sector during their active life and have returned to their village of origin and to agri-
culture for their retirement. Our expectation is that this measurement error is likely to
bias mobility upward (odds ratio downward).
18 This can be thought of as an inverse measure of how strong the off-diagonal elements
are in thematrix giving the joint distribution of the data for fathers' and sons' occupations,
as in Table 2; more precisely, one can re-write OR in Eq. (1) as the product of the counts of
the diagonal elements (F–F and NF–NF) divided by the product of the off-diagonal counts
(F–NF, NF–F).than men, with a “mothers–daughters” odds ratio of 10.7. We also
ﬁnd that there is more occupational mobility for daughters relative to
their father's sector than there is for sons relative to their mother's
sector.5. Intergenerational effects on adult consumption
We regress the log of cell-speciﬁc consumption expenditure
on dummy variables for having inherited land, housing and other assets
(ﬁnance, consumer durables and physical capital). The regressions also
include a large number of control variables to account for the heteroge-
neity in individual and household characteristics, including parental
characteristics. Speciﬁcally we control for gender, age and age squared,
age at ﬁrst marriage, whether one is the ﬁrst born of a given gender
among siblings with the same mother and same father, whether one
is the ﬁrst born among all children with the same mother and father,
whether the ﬁrst born sibling from the same mother and father is a
boy, number of brothers from the same father and mother, number of
brothers from the same father only and same mother only, and the
same three variables for sisters, ethnic group, being Muslim relative to
other religions, having some formal education (henceforth referred to
as “education”), whether fostered as a child, and whether fostered at a
young age (prior to two years of age, which typically implies a perma-
nent move for the child in the Senegal context). There are also controls
for parental characteristics (education, occupation, place of residence,
whether the father died in the last two years) and somedemographic var-
iables describing the household (log household size) and the individual's
cell (log cell size, share of adults and share of children age 5 and under).
We begin by following past literature in assuming the exogeneity of in-
heritance; we test robustness to relaxing this in Section 7.
Tables 3, 4 and 5 give results for (log) cell expenditure per person;
recall that this combines the cell-speciﬁc expenditures with imputed
values for the cell's share of jointly consumed items within the house-
hold. Table 3 ﬁrst presents the coefﬁcients on inheritance estimated
without any controls. This is followed by coefﬁcients estimated by
adding various correlates, which we do in two steps: adding controls
for geographic effects alone, and then adding the controls for individual,
Table 3
Estimated effects of inheritance on log cell per capita consumption with and without
controls.
(1)
No controls
(2)
Rural location
and department
dummies
(3)
As in (2) + controls for
individual and household
characteristics
Inherited land −0.324⁎⁎⁎ −0.0978⁎⁎ −0.0740⁎
(0.0541) (0.0430) (0.0449)
Inherited house 0.196⁎⁎⁎ 0.0733⁎⁎ 0.0736⁎⁎
(0.0438) (0.0361) (0.0368)
Other inheritance 0.0234 0.0889⁎⁎ 0.0642
(0.0494) (0.0424) (0.0419)
Constant 12.53⁎⁎⁎ 13.01⁎⁎⁎ 12.95⁎⁎⁎
(0.0276) (0.247) (0.285)
Observations 4339 4339 3392
R2 0.014 0.325 0.465
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level. Controls
included in the regression reported in column 3 are: rural location, the cell head's
gender, age and age squared, age at ﬁrst marriage, whether the ﬁrst born of a given
gender among siblings with the same mother and same father, whether the ﬁrst born
among all children with the same mother and father, whether the ﬁrst born sibling from
the same mother and father is a boy, number of brothers from the same father and
mother, number of brothers from the same father and same mother only, and the same
three variables for sisters, ethnic group, whether Muslim relative to other religions,
whether has some formal education, whether fostered as a child, and whether fostered
under two years of age; parent's characteristics (education, farm, non-farm or other occu-
pation, last place of residence, whether the father died in the last two years, whether the
mother died in the last two years); log household size, log cell size, cell's share of adults
and share of children age 5 and under and regional (department) dummies.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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controls for the full sample, and for both an urban–rural stratiﬁcation
and gender stratiﬁcation in Tables 4 and 5.19
Without any controls, inheriting land has a strong negative correla-
tion with consumption (Table 3): those who inherited land have
consumption that is lower by about 28%.20 But this is considerably
attenuated when one controls for location, reﬂecting the fact that rural
households tend to be both poorer and more likely to inherit land. The
negative effect is further reducedwith the addition of other controls, re-
maining close to 7%. Inheriting a house is strongly positively correlated
with consumption without controlling for location or other individual
and household characteristics. Here again, the effect is reduced, but re-
mains signiﬁcantly positive when the full set of controls is added (of the
order of 7%). Finally, a positive effect of other (non-land, non-housing)
forms of inheritance emerges when conditioning on location alone.
This ﬁnding of a small negative effect of land in the full sample with
controls loses statistical signiﬁcance in the various strata (urban/rural,
male/female and the gender/location interaction) (Tables 4 and 5).
Here and elsewhere, we cannot rule out the possibility that the small
or insigniﬁcant estimated impacts of land inheritance are due to the
fact that the variable is measured as a dummy variable as opposed to
land area or value, and hence does not capture sufﬁcient variation.
Given our data, we are unable to test this.
Housing inheritance has a positive effect in the full sample and
for urban women. The signiﬁcant effects of other types of inheritance
are conﬁned to the urban stratum and to men. When we stratify
by the interaction of gender with urban–rural residence, a sharper
picture emerges on the adult consumption gains from other forms of in-
heritance, namely that they are conﬁned to men (Table 5). Recall that
we ﬁnd a sizeable gender gap in consumption. Strikingly, this gender19 Given that we control for demographics, using consumption per equivalent adult in-
stead makes little or no difference to the estimates (depending on the functional form of
the scale).
20 As usual, the regression coefﬁcient is the change in log consumption resulting from a
unit change in the explanatory variable. Note that if the change in log consumption is x,
then the proportionate change in consumption is ex.gap in consumption largely vanishes when we add our controls. Ceteris
paribus then, adultmale heads of cells (who are typically, though not al-
ways, the overall household head as well) do not have higher consump-
tion than females (Table 4). Note, however, that our controls include
variables such as schooling, which are unequal between genders. So
our ﬁnding can be interpreted as indicating that the gender gap in
consumption can be explained by the gender difference in individual
and household characteristics.
Along with the gender differences in characteristics, which (as we
have seen) account for the gender disparity in consumption, there are
also gender differences in returns to characteristics. A Chow test rejects
the null hypothesis of equality of the coefﬁcients across the regressions
for men and women (F(72,1498) = 1.84; Prob. N F b 0.00005).
Both own education andmother's education are signiﬁcant in the full
sample consumption regressions. Strikingly, maternal education has a
much stronger effect—a change of 0.17 in log consumption—than pater-
nal education, and this is due to its effect in urban areas and for
women. But note that only 7.5% of mothers have some formal education.
Other parental characteristics matter. Having a father (but not a
mother) whoworked in the non-farm sector has a large and signiﬁcant
effect on log consumption of 0.30; having a father in farming has a
smaller effect (0.17). (The left out category is inactive.) These effects
are stronger for men than for women. It is clear that parental character-
istics matter, even though land and housing inheritance do not.
Being fostered out as a child is associatedwith higher adult consump-
tion; the effect is conﬁned tomen, and is stronger for those living in urban
areas. This result is consistent with the previously noted fact that the
common practice of fostering is often associated with investment in the
human capital of the child. Notice, however, that having been fostered
out young (under age 2) has an offsetting effect for men. The positive
effect on adult welfare is for those who were not fostered young.21
To throw some light on the costs and beneﬁts to adult offspring of pa-
rental sorting by sector and schooling, Table 6 presents the total effect on
log consumption of various combinations of fathers' andmothers' charac-
teristics using the full sample estimates. The results suggest thatwhatever
the educationof one's parents, havingbothparents in thenon-farmsector
yields higher consumption than having both in farming. That is probably
what onewould expect. However, there is amore surprising and interest-
ing effect of havingparents fromdifferent sectors. Themixed combination
of a father in a non-farm and a mother in a farm-related occupation pro-
vides the highest welfare gain to a child at any given combination of
parental education—a higher gain than having had both in non-farm ac-
tivities. This couldwell reﬂect longer-term beneﬁts from amore dynamic
and diversiﬁed family background. But notice that this only holdswhen it
is the fatherwho is in the non-farm sector; the reverse parental combina-
tion (father in farming; mother in non-farm work) yields the lowest
consumption gain at whatever education combination is considered—
even lower than having both parents in farming.
At any given combination of parental occupation, the consumption
gains are largest when both parents have had some formal schooling
(Table 6). Furthermore, for any parental farm and non-farm occupational
combination, having better schooled parents is better for the offspring's
adult living standards. Positive parentalmatching on education is beneﬁ-
cial while positive sorting on sector is not (holding education and all else
constant). Finally, mothers' formal education is more welfare enhancing
than fathers' education whatever the parents' combination of occupa-
tional sectors.
6. Intergenerational effects on economic activities and
geographic mobility
We now turn to the question of how much intergenerational
linkages matter to the sector of economic activity and location. Table 721 See Beck et al. (2014) for a detailed discussion of fostering practices in Senegal. On the
long term impact of fostering in Senegal see Coppoletta et al. (2011).
Table 4
Regressions for log cell expenditure per capita.
(1)
Full sample
(2)
Rural
(3)
Urban
(4)
Men
(5)
Women
Male −0.00550 −0.0400 0.0249 – –
(0.0409) (0.0614) (0.0564)
Age −0.00281 −0.00575 0.00327 0.00602 −0.0148⁎
(0.00623) (0.00755) (0.00993) (0.0101) (0.00829)
Age squared −2.31e−06 1.56e−06 −2.95e−05 −9.40e−05 0.000139
(6.24e−05) (7.56e−05) (9.89e−05) (9.50e−05) (8.74e−05)
Muslim 0.0649 −0.0934 0.123 0.0975 0.0409
(0.0968) (0.199) (0.106) (0.128) (0.105)
Serere ethnicity −0.191⁎⁎⁎ −0.209⁎ −0.181⁎⁎⁎ −0.259⁎⁎⁎ −0.131⁎
(0.0630) (0.122) (0.0685) (0.0845) (0.0697)
Poular ethnicity −0.0475 0.0687 −0.104 −0.0828 −0.0139
(0.0521) (0.0852) (0.0646) (0.0682) (0.0542)
Diola ethnicity −0.158 −0.163 −0.111 0.0259 −0.264⁎⁎⁎
(0.0995) (0.373) (0.102) (0.154) (0.0978)
Mandingue ethnicity −0.110 0.152 −0.256⁎⁎⁎ −0.175⁎ −0.0590
(0.0867) (0.159) (0.0804) (0.102) (0.0957)
Sarakole ethnicity −0.0853 0.0782 −0.104 −0.171 −0.00624
(0.127) (0.235) (0.167) (0.175) (0.146)
Mandiaque ethnicity −0.443⁎⁎ −0.585 −0.390⁎⁎ −0.181 −0.554⁎⁎⁎
(0.181) (0.380) (0.193) (0.217) (0.200)
Other ethnicities −0.0103 0.152 −0.128 0.0880 −0.101
(0.108) (0.180) (0.115) (0.142) (0.116)
Brothers same father −0.000649 −0.0113 0.00398 0.000877 −0.00205
(0.00782) (0.0106) (0.0114) (0.0135) (0.00969)
Brothers same parents 0.000895 0.00962 −0.00638 0.0159 −0.0134
(0.00940) (0.0129) (0.0132) (0.0147) (0.0117)
Sisters same father 0.0114 0.0201⁎ 0.00548 0.00171 0.0200⁎⁎
(0.00794) (0.0121) (0.0107) (0.0139) (0.00980)
Sisters same parents 0.0195⁎⁎ 0.0285⁎⁎ 0.0157 0.0123 0.0306⁎⁎⁎
(0.00908) (0.0142) (0.0122) (0.0143) (0.0117)
Brothers same mother 0.0459⁎⁎ 0.0325 0.0496⁎⁎ 0.0753⁎⁎⁎ 0.0271
(0.0180) (0.0317) (0.0219) (0.0257) (0.0230)
Sisters same mother −0.0287 −0.0246 −0.0251 −0.0374 −0.0246
(0.0206) (0.0270) (0.0294) (0.0291) (0.0287)
First same gender 0.00358 0.0408 −0.0323 −0.00374 0.0180
(0.0321) (0.0449) (0.0448) (0.0604) (0.0452)
First of siblings 0.0122 −0.0154 0.0463 −0.0337 0.0749
(0.0382) (0.0521) (0.0538) (0.0661) (0.0627)
First born is male 0.0561⁎ 0.106⁎⁎ −0.0113 0.0334 0.0931⁎⁎
(0.0310) (0.0435) (0.0413) (0.0628) (0.0415)
Father died recently −0.0188 −0.00483 −0.0176 0.0161 −0.0428
(0.0534) (0.0760) (0.0740) (0.100) (0.0585)
Father in farming 0.0932⁎⁎ 0.0567 0.123⁎ 0.0672 0.0986⁎⁎
(0.0418) (0.0534) (0.0660) (0.0573) (0.0490)
Mother in farm −0.0738 −0.0967 0.00610 −0.0922 −0.0672
(0.0449) (0.0589) (0.0669) (0.0619) (0.0538)
Father in non-farm 0.168⁎⁎⁎ 0.154⁎⁎ 0.177⁎⁎⁎ 0.198⁎⁎⁎ 0.134⁎⁎⁎
(0.0426) (0.0701) (0.0560) (0.0609) (0.0511)
Mother in non-farm −0.118⁎⁎⁎ −0.0516 −0.136⁎⁎ −0.164⁎⁎ −0.0793
(0.0441) (0.0686) (0.0574) (0.0696) (0.0525)
Father in ‘other’ 0.400⁎⁎⁎ 0.139 0.573⁎⁎ 0.422⁎⁎ 0.369
(0.151) (0.181) (0.250) (0.205) (0.250)
Mother in ‘other’ −0.223⁎⁎ −0.184⁎ 0.0543 −0.186 −0.313⁎
(0.0960) (0.104) (0.255) (0.128) (0.161)
Father's schooling 0.0744 −0.0656 0.0984⁎ 0.152⁎ 0.0356
(0.0493) (0.0905) (0.0561) (0.0802) (0.0592)
Mother's schooling 0.165⁎⁎⁎ 0.0987 0.228⁎⁎⁎ 0.0371 0.245⁎⁎⁎
(0.0630) (0.0959) (0.0816) (0.0879) (0.0893)
Father rural 0.00560 −0.0166 −0.0160 0.0498 −0.0292
(0.0510) (0.0799) (0.0667) (0.0911) (0.0584)
Mother rural −0.0659 −0.0394 −0.0707 −0.114 −0.0274
(0.0515) (0.0821) (0.0677) (0.0909) (0.0583)
Log hh size −0.305⁎⁎⁎ −0.289⁎⁎⁎ −0.315⁎⁎⁎ −0.286⁎⁎⁎ −0.327⁎⁎⁎
(0.0362) (0.0626) (0.0416) (0.0487) (0.0415)
Log cell size −0.112⁎⁎⁎ −0.170⁎⁎⁎ −0.100⁎⁎⁎ −0.141⁎⁎⁎ −0.0553
(0.0271) (0.0397) (0.0366) (0.0505) (0.0438)
Share of cell aged b5 −0.194⁎⁎ −0.224⁎ −0.126 −0.349⁎ −0.159
(0.0962) (0.132) (0.143) (0.202) (0.113)
Share of cell adults 0.438⁎⁎⁎ 0.245⁎⁎ 0.553⁎⁎⁎ 0.381⁎⁎⁎ 0.478⁎⁎⁎
(0.0769) (0.115) (0.105) (0.145) (0.0997)
Has formal schooling 0.274⁎⁎⁎ 0.160⁎⁎ 0.322⁎⁎⁎ 0.229⁎⁎⁎ 0.288⁎⁎⁎
(0.0361) (0.0638) (0.0438) (0.0535) (0.0461)
(continued on next page)
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Table 4 (continued)
(1)
Full sample
(2)
Rural
(3)
Urban
(4)
Men
(5)
Women
Fostered 0.102⁎⁎ 0.126⁎ 0.0987 0.159⁎⁎ 0.0256
(0.0521) (0.0767) (0.0714) (0.0785) (0.0648)
Fostered young −0.00118 −0.0452 −0.00601 −0.150 0.117
(0.0669) (0.103) (0.0904) (0.118) (0.0828)
Age at ﬁrst marriage −7.50e−05 0.00329 −0.00165 −0.00315 0.00450
(0.00276) (0.00419) (0.00362) (0.00403) (0.00379)
Inherited land −0.0740⁎ −0.0266 −0.0897 −0.102 −0.0366
(0.0449) (0.0691) (0.0586) (0.0622) (0.0539)
Inherited house 0.0736⁎⁎ 0.0601 0.0862⁎ 0.0617 0.0883⁎
(0.0368) (0.0614) (0.0448) (0.0535) (0.0452)
Other inheritance 0.0642 0.0330 0.114⁎ 0.159⁎⁎⁎ −0.0186
(0.0419) (0.0558) (0.0614) (0.0566) (0.0508)
Rural −0.298⁎⁎⁎ – – −0.322⁎⁎⁎ −0.291⁎⁎⁎
(0.0607) (0.0842) (0.0653)
Constant 12.95⁎⁎⁎ 13.41⁎⁎⁎ 12.46⁎⁎⁎ 13.69⁎⁎⁎ 13.52⁎⁎⁎
(0.285) (0.484) (0.326) (0.512) (0.366)
Observations 3392 1756 1636 1479 1913
R2 0.465 0.279 0.415 0.471 0.463
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, and are clustered at the household level. The variables ‘First same gender’, ‘First of siblings’ and ‘First born is male’ all refer to children of the
same father, same mother. Regressions also contain regional (department) dummies. The reference variables are Wolof ethnicity, all other religions, occupation ‘inactive’, share of cell
members 5–15, no and non-formal schooling.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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employment. Again, parental characteristics matter, though in some
possibly surprising ways. Having a father in farming does not have a
signiﬁcant effect, but having a mother who was a farmer makes it
more likely one will be a farmer. This is so for men and women, but
is signiﬁcantly larger for men in rural areas (consistent with the ef-
fect of having a mother in farming on the probability of inheriting
land being positive and stronger for men). Having had either parent
(and more so a mother) in the non-farm sector makes it less likely that
one will be a farmer in rural areas, with a far more pronounced effect
for men.
Parental schooling effects on the probability of being a farmer seem
weak, though for urban men there is a signiﬁcant negative effect of
mother's schooling. Own formal schooling makes it less likely men
will be in farming (particularly urban men), but makes this slightly
more likely for urban women.
We ﬁnd that inheriting land makes farming more likely though this
effect is conﬁned to women in rural areas. Endogeneity is a concern
here; as women rarely inherit land, those who remained in the same
village as their parents and are in farming are more likely to be the ones
who inherit land. Inheriting land does not make it more likely that men
will be farmers. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effects of inheriting a house.
Other (non-land, non-housing) forms of inheritance are associated with
lower probabilities of an adult being in agricultural self-employment.
This effect is found in both rural and urban areas, though it is stronger
for rural areas (Table 7).
Analogous results for non-farm occupations are found in Table 8. For
rural men, having a father in the rural non-farm sector enhances the
probability of being in that sector. On the other hand, having a mother
who farms or whose occupation is ‘other’ signiﬁcantly reduces that
likelihood for rural men. A mother in the non-farm sector signiﬁcantly
enhances the probability of an adult working in the non-farm sector,
although not for rural women. Higher own schooling increases the
probability for men (and it is a larger effect for men in rural areas) but
not for women. Fathers' schooling has no inﬂuence, while mothers' for-
mal education is positively associated with rural men's off-farm work.
We ﬁnd no evidence that inheriting land has a signiﬁcant effect on
the likelihood of doing non-farm activities (Table 8) (although, as we
will see, this changes whenwe allow land to be endogenous). However,
inheritance of other (non-land, non-housing) assets makes it morelikely that women overall, and men and women in urban Senegal, will
be employed in the non-farm sector (Table 8).
A number of effects on geographicmobility—identiﬁedbywhether an
adult lives in the same place as his or her parents—are evident in Table 9.
Having a farmer for a father makes a child's mobility more likely in the
full sample. The effect is much attenuated and only signiﬁcant at the
10% level for the rural and all male and female samples. Having a father
who worked in the non-farm sector has the opposite effect—increasing
the likelihood of living in the same place, though the effect is only signif-
icant for rural areas, and is larger for rural women. A mother who was
engaged in a non-agricultural activity also has a signiﬁcant effect on
living in the same place, but in this case, not for daughters. Children
with parents occupied in ‘other’ are also more likely to be where their
parents resided. Having a father with formal schooling makes mobility
more likely for urbanmen; amotherwith schoolingmakes it more likely
that rural men will live in the same place as their parents. Own formal
schooling makes mobility more likely, though the effect is only signiﬁ-
cant for men. These results underline the fact that the intergenerational
occupational mobility discussed in the last section implies geographical
mobility more often when parents are farmers than when they are in a
non-farm activity and hence, less likely to have a rural location.
Inheriting land does not have any signiﬁcant effect on the probability
of moving to a location different from where one's father resided in the
sample as awhole (Table 9). However, there is a sign that inheriting land
actually encourages such mobility for urban women. Inheriting a house
makes it more likely that a man living in rural areas will have the same
residence as his parents—in a rather obviousway since the one son who
will inherit the house is the one who intends to live in it (or already
does)—but there are no other signiﬁcant effects of this form of inheri-
tance. Nor are there any signiﬁcant effects of other (non-land, non-
housing) inheritance.
7. Tests of robustness
Possibly the effect of inheritance is diluted by including in the sample
cell heads whose parents are still alive, and cannot (of course) be a
source of inheritance. We tested this possibility by only including cases
where either the father or the mother is dead or both are dead. (Details
are found in the Statistical Addendum.) In all three cases, the coefﬁcients
and standard errorswere very similar to the results presented in Table 3.
Table 5
Regressions for log cell expenditure per capita by gender and rural/urban residence.
(1)
Rural men
(2)
Rural women
(3)
Urban men
(4)
Urban women
Age −0.0110 −0.00852 0.0310⁎⁎ −0.0216
(0.0138) (0.00866) (0.0148) (0.0134)
Age squared 2.80e−05 5.68e−05 −0.000290⁎⁎ 0.000245⁎
(0.000129) (8.85e−05) (0.000140) (0.000140)
Muslim −0.261 −0.00343 0.269⁎ 0.0682
(0.232) (0.196) (0.150) (0.127)
Serere ethnicity −0.186 −0.237⁎⁎ −0.271⁎⁎⁎ −0.0591
(0.161) (0.120) (0.0938) (0.0925)
Poular ethnicity 0.0758 0.0565 −0.168⁎ −0.0575
(0.103) (0.0914) (0.0948) (0.0680)
Diola ethnicity 0.308 −0.394 0.0561 −0.193⁎
(0.485) (0.391) (0.167) (0.104)
Mandingue ethnicity 0.238 0.126 −0.414⁎⁎⁎ −0.160⁎
(0.164) (0.184) (0.126) (0.0863)
Sarakole ethnicity −0.0774 0.285 −0.155 −0.0299
(0.322) (0.287) (0.239) (0.171)
Mandiaque ethnicity −0.481 −0.678⁎ 0.00144 −0.477⁎⁎
(0.408) (0.383) (0.262) (0.225)
Other ethnicity 0.326 0.0227 0.0234 −0.220⁎
(0.209) (0.198) (0.166) (0.129)
Brothers same father −0.0216 0.00527 0.0154 −0.0113
(0.0191) (0.0138) (0.0191) (0.0146)
Brothers same parents 0.0341 −0.0161 0.00828 −0.0173
(0.0233) (0.0153) (0.0190) (0.0172)
Sisters same father 0.0134 0.0215 −0.00529 0.0208
(0.0199) (0.0157) (0.0190) (0.0134)
Sisters same parents 0.00783 0.0522⁎⁎⁎ 0.00588 0.0244
(0.0217) (0.0173) (0.0188) (0.0162)
Brothers same mother 0.0401 0.0185 0.0845⁎⁎⁎ 0.0224
(0.0509) (0.0392) (0.0296) (0.0299)
Sisters same mother 0.0419 −0.0602⁎⁎ −0.0728⁎⁎ 0.00366
(0.0686) (0.0243) (0.0288) (0.0467)
First same gender 0.0263 0.0615 0.0461 −0.0491
(0.0822) (0.0630) (0.0864) (0.0636)
First of siblings −0.0861 0.0691 −0.0309 0.0769
(0.0942) (0.0897) (0.0964) (0.0866)
First born is male 0.106 0.152⁎⁎⁎ 0.00555 −0.00539
(0.0886) (0.0581) (0.0894) (0.0599)
Father died recently 0.0760 −0.0227 −0.00617 −0.0561
(0.140) (0.0920) (0.153) (0.0752)
Father in farming −0.0529 0.145⁎⁎ 0.239⁎⁎⁎ 0.00457
(0.0754) (0.0607) (0.0916) (0.0818)
Mother in farm −0.0828 −0.0999 −0.0873 0.0945
(0.0856) (0.0651) (0.0891) (0.0885)
Father in non-farm 0.0849 0.206⁎⁎ 0.279⁎⁎⁎ 0.0802
(0.0947) (0.0875) (0.0795) (0.0697)
Mother in non-farm −0.134 0.0652 −0.169⁎ −0.124⁎
(0.101) (0.0902) (0.0917) (0.0668)
Father in ‘other’ 0.147 0.0268 0.586⁎ 0.398
(0.240) (0.232) (0.322) (0.386)
Mother in ‘other’ −0.119 −0.287 0.401 0.0399
(0.136) (0.209) (0.301) (0.421)
Father's schooling −0.242⁎ 0.121 0.230⁎⁎ 0.0305
(0.142) (0.112) (0.0948) (0.0680)
Mother's schooling 0.0382 0.109 0.0969 0.292⁎⁎⁎
(0.158) (0.143) (0.117) (0.111)
Father rural −0.0790 0.00103 −0.0576 −0.0394
(0.159) (0.0894) (0.110) (0.0822)
Mother rural −0.167 0.0439 −0.0132 −0.0626
(0.165) (0.0870) (0.112) (0.0845)
Log hh size −0.207⁎⁎ −0.359⁎⁎⁎ −0.332⁎⁎⁎ −0.310⁎⁎⁎
(0.0872) (0.0636) (0.0537) (0.0557)
Log cell size −0.255⁎⁎⁎ −0.0863 −0.0880 −0.0756
(0.0776) (0.0616) (0.0664) (0.0606)
Share of cell aged b5 −0.631⁎⁎ −0.0906 0.123 −0.254
(0.286) (0.152) (0.303) (0.173)
Share of cell adults 0.104 0.309⁎⁎ 0.602⁎⁎⁎ 0.503⁎⁎⁎
(0.218) (0.137) (0.196) (0.148)
Has formal schooling 0.111 0.142 0.278⁎⁎⁎ 0.359⁎⁎⁎
(0.0876) (0.0871) (0.0704) (0.0552)
Fostered 0.209⁎ 0.0131 0.181 0.0178
(0.112) (0.0953) (0.118) (0.0861)
(continued on next page)
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Table 6
Returns to log per capita consumption of parental characteristics.
Formal schooling
Neither Father yes/
mother no
Father no/
mother yes
Both
Same sector
Both farm 0.019 0.093 0.184 0.258
Both non-farm 0.050 0.124 0.215 0.289
Mixed sectors
Father farm/mother non-farm −0.025 0.049 0.140 0.214
Father non-farm/mother farm 0.094 0.168 0.259 0.333
Note: Based on the coefﬁcients estimated for total log consumption per capita given in
Table 4, column 1.
Table 5 (continued)
(1)
Rural men
(2)
Rural women
(3)
Urban men
(4)
Urban women
Fostered young −0.299 0.108 −0.112 0.128
(0.182) (0.118) (0.157) (0.114)
Age at ﬁrst marriage 0.00241 0.00461 −0.00861 0.00613
(0.00641) (0.00586) (0.00552) (0.00501)
Inherited land −0.0875 0.0363 −0.127 −0.0600
(0.0898) (0.0845) (0.0921) (0.0697)
Inherited house 0.0298 0.0785 0.105 0.100⁎
(0.0799) (0.0768) (0.0752) (0.0576)
Other inheritance 0.176⁎⁎ −0.100 0.166⁎ 0.0458
(0.0727) (0.0636) (0.0888) (0.0786)
Constant 14.28⁎⁎⁎ 12.44⁎⁎⁎ 11.78⁎⁎⁎ 13.20⁎⁎⁎
(0.811) (0.534) (0.530) (0.384)
Observations 758 998 721 915
R2 0.292 0.309 0.419 0.413
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level. The variables ‘First same gender’, ‘First of siblings’ and ‘First born is male’ all refer to children of the same
father, same mother. Regressions also contain regional (department) dummies. The reference variables are Wolof ethnicity, all other religions, occupation ‘inactive’, share of cell
members 5–15, no and non-formal schooling.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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There were only minor differences for Table 4.22
We also tested sensitivity to allowing for an interaction effect
between inheritance and the time since the father died; for those with
a dead father, the mean time since death is 22 years (the median
is 19). It is not clear on a priori grounds what one would expect. The
inherited assetmay have a positive rate of return allowing for capital ac-
cumulation, though other factors may come into play; for example,
there were clearly fewer options to farming for those who inherited
the land a long time ago. Also, assets (including land) depreciate in
value over time. Our tests involved simply adding an interaction effect
between inheritance and years since the death of the father to the
preceding regressions.23 For cell consumption per capita, there was a
negative interaction effect though only among urban men, for which
the effect was signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The total effect was positive
up to about 30 years, though not signiﬁcant even when the father
died recently. For agricultural self-employment the interaction effect
was often positive though generally not signiﬁcant, except for urban
men; for non-farm employment the pattern switched, with a negative22 When conﬁned to the sample with the father dead, the positive effect of inheriting a
house on consumption remained but only in the urban sample. A positive effect of
inheriting a house was found for rural areas in the sample with the mother dead. The ef-
fects ofmaternal characteristics (sector and education) on the probability of being a farm-
er are stronger when one conﬁnes attention to the sample with either parent dead.
23 If one assumes that the current value per unit of past inheritance is given by f(t)= [(1+
r)(1 − d)]t (where r is the rate of return, d is the depreciation rate and t is the number of
years since father's death) then the function f(t) can be approximated by a linear function
of twith constant parameters if one takes itsﬁrst-order Taylor series expansion and assumes
that r and d are common across all households. However, these are potentially strong as-
sumptions, especially the constancy of returns.interaction effect, though again not strong. However, allowing for such
an interaction effect does not change the main ﬁndings reported above.
Yet another variation is to allow for “cross-effects” of inheritance and
education of the spouse (for example, including the inheritance of a
woman's husband in the regression for her consumption or economic
activity). We found no signiﬁcant cross-effects of inheritance or educa-
tion on consumption for either men or women. Nor were there any sig-
niﬁcant effects of a husband's inheritance on thewife's sector of work.24
There were signs that a wife's inheritance increased the likelihood of
men in rural areas being farmers, and made it more likely that urban
men would be inactive. One signiﬁcant cross-effect was that having
an educatedhusbandmademobilitymore likely forwomen, asmeasured
bywhether she lived in the same village as her parents. Thiswas found in
both urban and rural areas.
Another possible concern is that some of our regressorsmay be con-
sidered endogenous. The main results on the effects of inheritance on
the various dependent variables were found to be robust to dropping
other potentially endogenous variables, namely own-schooling, being
fostered as a child and age at ﬁrst marriage. (The endogeneity concern
here is that these variables may be jointly determined with land inher-
itance.) One change of note is that dropping own education revealed
even weaker effects of parental education on sector of employment.
Our assumption that past inheritance is exogenous to current living
standards can be questioned. Choices about who inherits the land may
be inﬂuenced by factors that are unobserved by us, but observed by
the parents or other stakeholders—factors that are also correlated
with the economic activity and economic welfare of the child on
reaching adulthood. It may be decided by the family group that one of
the sons is best suited to taking charge of the family farm on the father's
death. This may reﬂect a latent interest or ability at farming, revealed
while growing up. Or it may be that other sons show more aptitude
for non-farm work. Parents may also have gender preferences in their
choices about inheritance and schooling—choices that are inﬂuenced
bybothmarket andnon-market parameters.25 Another potential source
of endogeneity is the fact that children could possibly decline the inher-
itance, in particular of land, if taking care of it is not compatible with24 Among those ruralwomenwhosehusband inherited land, inmost cases the husband al-
so had some other form of (non-land, non-housing) inheritance (there were only 27 excep-
tions, comprising women whose husband only got some other inheritance). This made it
impossible to credibly separate these two forms of spousal inheritance forwomen, sowe ag-
gregated them.
25 For example, using data from the rural Philippines, Estudillo et al. (2001) show how
sons are preferred for land inheritance, while daughters are preferred for investments in
schooling.
Table 7
Marginal effects of inheritance, schooling and parental characteristics on agricultural employment.
(1)
All
(2)
Rural
(3)
Urban
(4)
Men
(5)
Women
(6)
Rural men
(7)
Rural women
(8)
Urban men
(9)
Urban women
Father in farming 0.0169 0.0141 0.00740 0.0120 0.0198 −0.00175 0.0353 0.0218 −0.00463
(0.0168) (0.0324) (0.0104) (0.0271) (0.0191) (0.0485) (0.0409) (0.0196) (0.00294)
Mother in farm 0.0770⁎⁎⁎ 0.116⁎⁎⁎ 0.0175 0.112⁎⁎⁎ 0.0567⁎⁎ 0.192⁎⁎⁎ 0.0692 −0.0209⁎⁎ 0.0500
(0.0240) (0.0396) (0.0185) (0.0377) (0.0241) (0.0588) (0.0426) (0.00932) (0.0313)
Father in non-farm −0.0235 −0.0765⁎ −0.00121 −0.0523 −0.0213 −0.180⁎⁎⁎ −0.0226 0.00792 −0.0109
(0.0198) (0.0450) (0.0103) (0.0325) (0.0243) (0.0653) (0.0634) (0.0152) (0.00724)
Mother in non-farm −0.0541⁎⁎⁎ −0.159⁎⁎⁎ −0.00426 −0.105⁎⁎⁎ −0.0262 −0.237⁎⁎⁎ −0.106⁎ −0.0129 −0.000300
(0.0208) (0.0483) (0.00923) (0.0325) (0.0237) (0.0679) (0.0588) (0.0119) (0.00306)
Father in ‘other’ −0.112⁎⁎⁎ −0.244⁎⁎⁎ – −0.142⁎⁎⁎ – −0.289⁎⁎ – – –
(0.0239) (0.0827) (0.0451) (0.118)
Mother in ‘other’ −0.104⁎⁎⁎ −0.221⁎⁎⁎ – −0.150⁎⁎⁎ −0.0773⁎⁎⁎ −0.276⁎⁎⁎ −0.174⁎⁎⁎ – –
(0.0177) (0.0490) (0.0276) (0.0184) (0.0789) (0.0578)
Father's schooling 0.0273 0.0795 −0.00209 0.0200 0.0103 0.0148 0.0803 0.00639 −0.000983
(0.0301) (0.0819) (0.00978) (0.0516) (0.0321) (0.121) (0.103) (0.0194) (0.00279)
Mother's schooling −0.0147 −0.0963 0.00123 −0.0849⁎ 0.0356 −0.145 −0.0947 −0.0307⁎⁎⁎ 0.0353
(0.0384) (0.0776) (0.0159) (0.0454) (0.0530) (0.107) (0.0872) (0.00879) (0.0275)
Own schooling −0.0203 −0.0673 −0.00524 −0.0656⁎⁎ 0.0354 −0.0902 0.0136 −0.0542⁎⁎⁎ 0.00835⁎
(0.0181) (0.0451) (0.00802) (0.0282) (0.0243) (0.0633) (0.0621) (0.0170) (0.00474)
Inherited land 0.0557⁎⁎ 0.0801⁎ 0.00998 0.00373 0.114⁎⁎⁎ −0.00998 0.171⁎⁎⁎ 0.00312 0.0118
(0.0218) (0.0412) (0.0128) (0.0304) (0.0343) (0.0571) (0.0643) (0.0158) (0.0100)
Inherited house 0.00825 0.0128 0.0148 0.00210 0.0153 −0.0298 0.0769 0.0196 −0.000619
(0.0180) (0.0371) (0.0117) (0.0273) (0.0218) (0.0515) (0.0528) (0.0144) (0.00375)
Inherited other −0.0404⁎⁎ −0.0669⁎ −0.0157⁎⁎ −0.0402 −0.0255 −0.0519 −0.0438 −0.0142 −0.00492⁎
(0.0160) (0.0343) (0.00723) (0.0260) (0.0186) (0.0490) (0.0442) (0.0114) (0.00270)
Observations 3407 1761 1565 1479 1843 752 957 675 725
Pseudo R2 0.306 0.222 0.240 0.318 0.348 0.234 0.285 0.314 0.433
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level.Marginal effects are reported. The regressions include controls listed in Table 3 notes. The ‘other’ occupation
drops out of the urban regressions as it is found only in rural areas.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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they feel that their siblings have a greater need for it.
In testing the robustness of our results to treating inheritance
as endogenous, the key identifying assumption we make is that theTable 8
Marginal effects of inheritance, schooling and parental characteristics on non-agricultural emp
(1)
All
(2)
Rural
(3)
Urban
(4)
Men
Father in farming 0.0122 −0.00256 0.0333 0.0355
(0.0273) (0.0301) (0.0381) (0.0373)
Mother in farm −0.0350 −0.0388 0.0275 −0.131⁎⁎⁎
(0.0308) (0.0322) (0.0464) (0.0448)
Father in non-farm 0.0377 0.106⁎⁎ −0.00258 0.0979⁎⁎
(0.0283) (0.0440) (0.0334) (0.0429)
Mother in non-farm 0.140⁎⁎⁎ 0.157⁎⁎⁎ 0.133⁎⁎⁎ 0.168⁎⁎⁎
(0.0302) (0.0544) (0.0296) (0.0482)
Father in ‘other’ −0.111 0.0334 −0.201 −0.0914
(0.113) (0.122) (0.172) (0.175)
Mother in ‘other’ −0.201⁎⁎⁎ −0.173⁎⁎⁎ 0.0144 −0.308⁎⁎⁎
(0.0761) (0.0432) (0.250) (0.107)
Father's schooling −0.0303 −0.0765 0.0245 −0.0107
(0.0326) (0.0549) (0.0348) (0.0603)
Mother's schooling −0.00922 0.172⁎ −0.0652 0.0655
(0.0476) (0.0889) (0.0530) (0.0835)
Own schooling 0.0560⁎⁎ 0.0919⁎⁎ 0.0375 0.166⁎⁎⁎
(0.0258) (0.0437) (0.0290) (0.0364)
Inherited land −0.0323 −0.0161 0.00446 0.00839
(0.0305) (0.0359) (0.0434) (0.0429)
Inherited house 0.0225 −0.00491 0.0173 −0.00856
(0.0269) (0.0344) (0.0331) (0.0382)
Inherited other 0.0464⁎ 0.00324 0.121⁎⁎⁎ 0.0170
(0.0272) (0.0316) (0.0335) (0.0362)
Observations 3385 1732 1646 1479
Pseudo R2 0.208 0.154 0.156 0.262
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level. Marginal effect
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.death of the father or mother only matters to an individual adult's
current economic welfare via inheritance of land or other assets. It is
hard to see why parental death sometime in the past would matter to
current adult consumption except via inheritance and (hence) wealth.loyment.
(5)
Women
(6)
Rural men
(7)
Rural women
(8)
Urban men
(9)
Urban women
−0.00763 0.0202 −0.0255 0.0330 0.0430
(0.0339) (0.0469) (0.0340) (0.0411) (0.0602)
0.0354 −0.148⁎⁎⁎ 0.0245 −0.0146 0.0493
(0.0378) (0.0497) (0.0368) (0.0581) (0.0686)
0.00573 0.199⁎⁎ 0.0636 0.0383 −0.0144
(0.0366) (0.0774) (0.0559) (0.0393) (0.0506)
0.128⁎⁎⁎ 0.222⁎⁎ 0.0961 0.103⁎⁎⁎ 0.144⁎⁎⁎
(0.0379) (0.0899) (0.0631) (0.0328) (0.0455)
−0.134 0.106 – −0.398⁎ −0.0866
(0.108) (0.152) (0.214) (0.188)
0.0325 −0.270⁎⁎⁎ 0.0117 −0.129 0.160
(0.145) (0.0607) (0.112) (0.238) (0.312)
−0.0350 −0.0377 −0.0619 0.0401 −0.000904
(0.0384) (0.118) (0.0617) (0.0445) (0.0493)
−0.0489 0.284⁎⁎ 0.100 −0.0215 −0.0856
(0.0510) (0.124) (0.106) (0.0774) (0.0683)
0.00599 0.278⁎⁎⁎ 0.0378 0.118⁎⁎⁎ −0.0172
(0.0321) (0.0682) (0.0504) (0.0350) (0.0412)
−0.0209 0.0656 −0.0615 −0.0307 0.0576
(0.0397) (0.0566) (0.0409) (0.0494) (0.0604)
0.0324 −0.0278 0.0152 −0.0163 0.0285
(0.0335) (0.0528) (0.0441) (0.0375) (0.0453)
0.0855⁎⁎ −0.0120 0.0297 0.0752⁎⁎ 0.174⁎⁎⁎
(0.0354) (0.0467) (0.0398) (0.0341) (0.0499)
1906 741 974 718 921
0.175 0.233 0.148 0.148 0.141
s are reported. The regressions include controls listed in Table 3 notes.
Table 9
Marginal effects of inheritance, schooling and parental characteristics on living in the same residence.
(1)
All
(2)
Rural
(3)
Urban
(4)
Men
(5)
Women
(6)
Rural men
(7)
Rural women
(8)
Urban men
(9)
Urban women
Father in farming −0.0730⁎⁎⁎ −0.0541⁎ −0.0448 −0.0630⁎ −0.0619⁎ −0.0296 −0.0483 −0.0412 −0.0643
(0.0259) (0.0325) (0.0522) (0.0359) (0.0339) (0.0200) (0.0458) (0.0774) (0.0667)
Mother in farm −0.00612 0.00221 0.000699 0.0239 −0.0299 0.0316⁎ −0.0441 0.00264 0.0229
(0.0289) (0.0352) (0.0649) (0.0397) (0.0369) (0.0189) (0.0480) (0.104) (0.0853)
Father in non-farm 0.0755⁎⁎ 0.125⁎⁎⁎ 0.0438 0.0634⁎ 0.0693⁎ 0.0536⁎⁎⁎ 0.182⁎⁎⁎ 0.0214 0.0451
(0.0298) (0.0429) (0.0427) (0.0378) (0.0389) (0.0170) (0.0700) (0.0654) (0.0535)
Mother in non-farm 0.120⁎⁎⁎ 0.150⁎⁎⁎ 0.105⁎⁎⁎ 0.121⁎⁎⁎ 0.0681⁎ 0.0567⁎⁎⁎ 0.123 0.175⁎⁎ 0.0676
(0.0297) (0.0441) (0.0398) (0.0385) (0.0378) (0.0162) (0.0817) (0.0723) (0.0474)
Father in ‘other’ 0.192⁎⁎ – 0.0547 0.0656 0.268⁎⁎ – – −0.117 0.119
(0.0878) (0.149) (0.103) (0.128) (0.213) (0.187)
Mother in ‘other’ 0.248⁎⁎⁎ 0.131⁎ 0.322⁎⁎ 0.170⁎⁎ 0.249⁎⁎ 0.0461⁎⁎ 0.144 0.116 0.280
(0.0585) (0.0747) (0.127) (0.0693) (0.108) (0.0227) (0.160) (0.165) (0.187)
Father's schooling −0.0282 0.0846 −0.0667⁎ −0.0644 −0.0321 0.0248 0.0326 −0.120⁎⁎ −0.0278
(0.0360) (0.0693) (0.0393) (0.0514) (0.0440) (0.0410) (0.113) (0.0606) (0.0497)
Mother's schooling 0.0740 0.146⁎⁎ −0.0159 0.0781 0.0249 0.0509⁎⁎⁎ 0.183 0.0182 −0.0531
(0.0452) (0.0608) (0.0554) (0.0654) (0.0583) (0.0171) (0.113) (0.119) (0.0625)
Own schooling −0.0457⁎ −0.0606 −0.0698⁎⁎ −0.0762⁎⁎ −0.00579 −0.105⁎⁎ 0.0352 −0.107⁎ −0.0672
(0.0277) (0.0536) (0.0343) (0.0383) (0.0356) (0.0504) (0.0705) (0.0581) (0.0436)
Inherited land −0.0213 0.0288 −0.0948⁎⁎ 0.0221 −0.0810⁎⁎ 0.0349 0.0244 −0.0574 −0.120⁎⁎
(0.0283) (0.0387) (0.0419) (0.0383) (0.0389) (0.0233) (0.0613) (0.0703) (0.0556)
Inherited house 0.0459⁎ 0.00788 0.0469 0.0562⁎ 0.0250 0.0408⁎ −0.0449 0.0618 0.0291
(0.0245) (0.0365) (0.0349) (0.0321) (0.0328) (0.0227) (0.0563) (0.0564) (0.0438)
Inherited other 0.0170 0.0239 0.000188 0.0242 −0.0220 0.0258 −0.00785 0.0282 −0.0218
(0.0257) (0.0351) (0.0422) (0.0342) (0.0349) (0.0211) (0.0537) (0.0692) (0.0537)
Observations 3407 1736 1646 1436 1921 701 994 702 921
Pseudo R2 0.180 0.279 0.330 0.346 0.109 0.366 0.183 0.426 0.309
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level. Marginal effects are reported. The regressions include controls listed in Table 3 notes.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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control for a father's recent death (within the last two years) in all our
regressions.
For the purpose of testing robustness to allowing for endogenous
land inheritance we assume that parents ﬁrst decide who gets the
land, and on that basis then determine the assignment of non-land in-
heritance, education, and fostering.We also assume that age atmarriage
is endogenous, and determined in part by whether one inherited the
land. Thus we treat these variables as unidentiﬁed functions of land in-
heritance and the remaining regression controls, so that we can solve
for the outcomes of interest as functions of only land-inheritance and
those controls. Thuswe are able to treat land inheritance as endogenous
using parental death as the only available IV.26
The Statistical Addendumgives the ﬁrst-stage regressions. Unsurpris-
ingly, the death of either parent signiﬁcantly increased the probability of
inheritance, and the coefﬁcients are considerably higher for paternal
death.
Table 10 gives the IV estimates, treating land inheritance as endoge-
nous, for each of the dependent variables.27 (Note that the estimator is
not feasible for the sub-sample for which the father is dead.) Our results
on land inheritance are reasonably robust to relaxing the exogeneity
assumption. In particular, we still ﬁnd that land inheritance does not
convey any signiﬁcant consumption beneﬁt.
However, we now ﬁnd that land inheritance tends to encourage a
male to only shift from farm to non-farm work, suggesting that there
was a downward bias in the earlier estimates. Whenwe stratify accord-
ing to whether the man is the household head or not we ﬁnd that this
effect is far stronger in size and only statistically signiﬁcant for those26 We tried using death of father and death of mother as two IVs for two inheritance var-
iables (land and other) but these did not have sufﬁcient power for credible identiﬁcation.
27 For consumption, we also used the treatment effects model (the “treatreg” estimator
in STATA) which uses full maximum likelihood to estimate the effect of an endogenously
chosen binary treatment on another endogenous continuous variable, conditional on two
sets of independent variables. This gave very similar results.who are not household heads. Table 11 gives a split of the results for
farm and non-farm activities (as well as for the other dependent vari-
ables) according to whether or not the cell head is also the overall
household head.28 The IV coefﬁcients on land inheritance in the non-
farm regression are 0.133 (s.e. = 0.105) for male heads of household
and 0.457 (s.e. = 0.151) for male non-heads. Likewise, the signiﬁcant
negative impact of inheriting land on being a farmer is only present
for non-household heads. The latter sub-sample tends to be comprised
of married brothers of household heads. Finally, and in line with the
above ﬁndings, land inheritance also makes it signiﬁcantly more likely
that male heads live where their parents lived, and less likely for non-
heads. When land inheritance comes without the responsibilities of
headship it appears to be an important factor in encouraging diversiﬁca-
tion into non-farm activities.8. Implications for explaining inequality
It is clear from these results that bequests can play little role in perpet-
uating consumption inequality. However, other parental characteristics
clearly do matter, both directly and via a child's characteristics at adult-
hood, notably education. To quantify the contributions of the various
additive factors we have identiﬁed above, we follow Shorrocks (1982)
in identifying the contribution of the kth explanatory variable to total
inequality by its share of variance, with equal sharing of the interaction
terms stemming from correlations among the factors. (Shorrocks terms
this the “natural decomposition” and shows that, under certain condi-
tions, it is also relevant to other inequality measures besides the vari-
ance.) Following Fields (2003), when the “income” variable y is given
by its linear regression on a vector x, this gives:
ck ¼
βk cov xk; yð Þ
var yð Þ ð2Þ28 No such interaction effects were evident for the other dependent variables in Table 11.
Table 10
IV estimates for all dependent variables for the total, men only and women only samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Log per cap expenditures Farm employment Non-farm Same residence as parents
All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women
Inherited land 0.119 0.0475 0.214 −0.0394 −0.159⁎⁎ 0.0510 0.124⁎⁎ 0.178⁎⁎ 0.0650 0.0373 0.0756 −0.0316
(0.110) (0.151) (0.164) (0.0449) (0.0714) (0.0602) (0.0611) (0.0856) (0.0914) (0.0614) (0.0751) (0.0934)
Father in farming 0.0849⁎⁎ 0.0537 0.0955⁎⁎ 0.0103 0.00758 0.0167 0.0192 0.0364 0.000268 −0.0589⁎⁎⁎ −0.0404⁎ −0.0636⁎⁎
(0.0404) (0.0568) (0.0474) (0.0195) (0.0289) (0.0226) (0.0218) (0.0305) (0.0277) (0.0209) (0.0239) (0.0304)
Mother in farming −0.0811⁎ −0.0840 −0.0936⁎ 0.0965⁎⁎⁎ 0.113⁎⁎⁎ 0.0791⁎⁎⁎ −0.0333 −0.105⁎⁎⁎ 0.0221 −0.00340 0.0230 −0.0235
(0.0440) (0.0631) (0.0523) (0.0248) (0.0346) (0.0285) (0.0239) (0.0358) (0.0300) (0.0239) (0.0280) (0.0328)
Father in non-farm 0.210⁎⁎⁎ 0.226⁎⁎⁎ 0.181⁎⁎⁎ −0.0217 −0.0651⁎⁎ −0.0135 0.0575⁎⁎ 0.122⁎⁎⁎ 0.0241 0.0668⁎⁎⁎ 0.0552⁎ 0.0648⁎
(0.0442) (0.0626) (0.0547) (0.0172) (0.0291) (0.0201) (0.0238) (0.0359) (0.0326) (0.0253) (0.0317) (0.0354)
Mother in non-farm −0.0980⁎⁎ −0.135⁎⁎ −0.0678 −0.0285⁎ −0.0695⁎⁎ −0.0235 0.108⁎⁎⁎ 0.105⁎⁎⁎ 0.113⁎⁎⁎ 0.106⁎⁎⁎ 0.118⁎⁎⁎ 0.0609⁎
(0.0436) (0.0679) (0.0533) (0.0157) (0.0283) (0.0185) (0.0247) (0.0372) (0.0336) (0.0256) (0.0327) (0.0346)
Father's schooling 0.170⁎⁎⁎ 0.263⁎⁎⁎ 0.129⁎⁎ 0.0138 0.0109 0.00273 −0.0175 0.00455 −0.0240 −0.0114 −0.0430 −0.00684
(0.0503) (0.0784) (0.0610) (0.0152) (0.0277) (0.0177) (0.0262) (0.0395) (0.0357) (0.0296) (0.0383) (0.0381)
Mother's schooling 0.193⁎⁎⁎ 0.0571 0.278⁎⁎⁎ 0.00894 −0.0399 0.0293 −0.0210 0.0420 −0.0618 0.0543 0.0764 0.0140
(0.0638) (0.0974) (0.0863) (0.0248) (0.0432) (0.0264) (0.0373) (0.0607) (0.0453) (0.0361) (0.0503) (0.0492)
Constant 13.73⁎⁎⁎ 12.97⁎⁎⁎ 13.79⁎⁎⁎ 0.149 0.789⁎⁎⁎ 0.537⁎⁎⁎ 0.386⁎⁎ 0.0374 0.201 0.608⁎⁎⁎ 0.623⁎⁎⁎ 0.752⁎⁎⁎
(0.308) (0.412) (0.363) (0.197) (0.161) (0.148) (0.197) (0.179) (0.135) (0.135) (0.210) (0.228)
Observations 3571 1554 2017 3587 1561 2026 3587 1561 2026 3587 1561 2026
R2 0.449 0.461 0.437 0.286 0.306 0.326 0.242 0.278 0.212 0.218 0.393 0.147
Notes: Linear IV coefﬁcients for (4)–(12). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level. The regressions exclude own education, whether fostered and age at ﬁrst marriage; other controls are as listed in Table 3 notes.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
341
S.Lam
bertetal./JournalofD
evelopm
entEconom
ics
110
(2014)
327
–344
Table 11
IV estimates for all dependent variables for the sample of men only.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log expenditure per capita Farm employment Non-farm employment Same residence as parents
Heads Non-heads Heads Non-heads Heads Non-heads Heads Non-heads
Inherited land 0.168 −0.307 −0.127 −0.283⁎⁎ 0.133 0.457⁎⁎⁎ 0.224⁎⁎ −0.200⁎
(0.200) (0.261) (0.0896) (0.115) (0.105) (0.151) (0.107) (0.111)
Father in farming 0.0950 −0.154 0.00702 −0.0133 0.0278 0.115 −0.0504⁎ −0.0463
(0.0654) (0.119) (0.0306) (0.0650) (0.0330) (0.0808) (0.0275) (0.0566)
Mother in farming −0.137⁎⁎ 0.272⁎ 0.0512 0.305⁎⁎⁎ −0.0676⁎ −0.210⁎⁎ 0.0297 0.0134
(0.0698) (0.146) (0.0351) (0.0861) (0.0378) (0.0985) (0.0314) (0.0744)
Father in non-farm 0.309⁎⁎⁎ −0.0705 −0.0717⁎⁎ −0.0784 0.0907⁎⁎ 0.330⁎⁎⁎ 0.0483 0.0387
(0.0716) (0.146) (0.0321) (0.0612) (0.0391) (0.0885) (0.0378) (0.0641)
Mother in non-farm −0.105 −0.0622 −0.0803⁎⁎ −0.0459 0.128⁎⁎⁎ 0.0409 0.112⁎⁎ 0.119⁎⁎
(0.0828) (0.110) (0.0353) (0.0451) (0.0440) (0.0699) (0.0435) (0.0464)
Father's schooling 0.331⁎⁎⁎ 0.0554 0.0423 −0.0976⁎ −0.00891 0.0890 −0.0566 −0.0118
(0.0991) (0.119) (0.0329) (0.0512) (0.0451) (0.0939) (0.0501) (0.0616)
Mother's schooling −0.0147 0.258⁎ −0.0658 −0.000177 0.0688 −0.00361 0.0863 −0.00846
(0.122) (0.153) (0.0504) (0.0590) (0.0662) (0.116) (0.0678) (0.0717)
Constant 13.73⁎⁎⁎ 13.26⁎⁎⁎ 0.199 −0.245 0.431 0.110 0.938⁎⁎⁎ 0.931⁎⁎⁎
(0.483) (0.856) (0.245) (0.361) (0.278) (0.574) (0.209) (0.328)
Observations 1193 361 1198 363 1198 363 1198 363
R2 0.451 0.505 0.327 0.452 0.309 0.340 0.372 0.358
Notes: Linear IV coefﬁcients for (3)–(8). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level. The regressions exclude own education, whether fostered and age at ﬁrst
marriage; other controls are as listed in Table 3 notes.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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yi ¼
Xm
k¼1
βkxik: ð3Þ
And xik is the kth predictor (xim can be taken to be an error term, with
βm = 1). Thus the contribution of the kth explanatory variable to in-
equality in y is simply the product of the partial regression coefﬁcient
of y on xk (holding all other variables constant)with the total regression
coefﬁcient of xk on y (holding nothing else constant). Note that the de-
composition is unchanged if y is the log of income (Fields, 2003).
Table 12 presents decompositions of consumption inequality
implied by the regressions in Table 4. As expected, the inheritance
variables (land, housing or other assets) contribute very little. Far more
important to inequality than these forms of inheritance is “own school-
ing,” which contributes 9% to overall consumption inequality (almost
one ﬁfth of the explained component) and 11% in urban Senegal. The
share is even higher for women but is much lower in rural areas. The
father's sector of employment is important, with the incidence of non-
farm parental work contributing almost 6%, while the incidence of farm
employment among fathers reduced inequality. Demographics, espe-
cially cell size and the proportion of adults, also emerge as large contrib-
utors to inequality, especially in rural areas. In the national sample,
almost half of the explained inequality is attributable to rural–urban
location.
9. Conclusions
We ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant intergenerational linkages in this set-
ting. This is evident in the correlations between parents' and children's
sectors of occupation, which persist on adding controls for heterogeneity
in other respects. Nonetheless, there is considerable intergenerational
mobility, both across sectors and residentially. This is primarily associat-
ed with the transition from farm to non-farm activities. Only one third
of the sons of farmers stayed in farming. Father–son mobility between
farm and non-farm sectors is high in Senegal relative to other developing
countries for which comparable estimates are available. And adultwomen in our sample are far more economically active than were their
mothers, although there is still less occupational mobility for women.
Our results suggest that gender plays an important role. There is con-
sumption inequality between men and women, though this is largely
accountable to differences in observable factors such as education. The
intergenerational linkages through the mother appear to be stronger
than through the father, including on the son's economic activity. Edu-
cated mothers are more likely to have sons in the non-farm sector.
While women with formal schooling are no more likely to be in non-
farm employment and (slightly) more likely to be farmers, it is their
sons who are more likely to ﬁnd their way into the non-farm sector.
Assuming conditional exogeneity of inheritance (and with a wide
range of controls), inheriting the land makes it more likely that a
woman will stay a farmer, but this is not so for men. Inheriting other
(non-land, non-housing) assets appears to strongly help get urban
women into non-farm work, but the effect is less signiﬁcant and smaller
for urbanmen and not present in rural areas. However, endogeneity bias
might partly account for those results. As a robustness test, we allow for
the possible endogeneity of land inheritance by assuming that the
death of a parent only matters via inheritance (though allowing for the
short-term shock of parental death).With only one instrumental variable
we are only able to identify the causal effect of land inheritance, subject
to the aforementioned exclusion restriction. We ﬁnd evidence that land
inheritance does play a role in facilitating diversiﬁcation from farm into
non-farm activities, although this is only present for men who do not
also inherit the responsibilities of being the overall head of the household.
The potential wealth effect of inheritance on activity choice seems to be
inhibited by the obligations attendant to household headship.
On average, inheriting the land or house brings no signiﬁcant gain to
an adult's consumption. It appears that intra-household allocation
across generations comes fairly close to equalizing consumption
between otherwise identical individuals, only one of whom takes on
the responsibility for the family's land and housing assets. However,
we ﬁnd that there are signiﬁcant gains from inheriting other (non-
land and non-housing) assets. In particular, formal schooling appears
to yield much higher returns.
In short, while intergenerational linkages clearly matter, there still
appears to be considerable intergenerational mobility in this setting. In-
heritance of land or housing contributes very little to overall inequality,
Table 12
Inequality decomposition for log consumption per person implied by Table 4.
Share of inequality attributable to each source (%)
All Rural Urban Men Women
Male −0.07 −1.03 0.60 – –
Age −0.65 0.39 1.11 −0.07 −2.81
Age squared 0.05 −0.05 −0.89 0.66 2.44
Muslim −0.05 −0.11 0.00 −0.11 −0.03
Serere 0.79 3.40 −0.28 1.14 0.54
Poular 0.26 0.63 1.02 0.84 0.03
Diola 0.04 0.94 −0.01 0.02 0.30
Mandingue 0.25 −0.10 1.10 0.55 0.07
Sarakole −0.06 0.41 −0.06 −0.08 −0.01
Mandiaque 0.05 0.91 0.36 −0.09 0.32
Other ethnicity −0.01 0.36 −0.08 0.17 0.00
Brothers same father 0.001 −0.08 0.19 0.09 −0.03
Brothers same parents 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.43 0.00
Sisters same father 0.39 0.62 0.24 0.01 0.82
Sisters same parents 0.34 0.70 0.20 0.15 0.91
Brothers same mother 0.55 0.44 0.52 0.87 0.38
Sisters same mother −0.17 0.12 −0.08 −0.12 −0.26
First same gender 0.004 0.03 −0.02 0.01 0.06
First of siblings 0.06 0.00 0.36 −0.05 0.36
First born is male 0.34 2.04 −0.08 0.06 0.03
Father dead recently 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04
Father in farming −1.60 −0.50 −0.87 −0.84 −2.12
Mother in farming 1.42 2.74 −0.04 1.49 1.48
Father in non-farm 4.45 1.19 3.41 4.90 4.03
Mother in non-farm −0.48 −0.01 0.68 −0.15 −0.64
Father in ‘other’ 0.02 −0.27 1.01 −0.28 0.15
Mother in ‘other’ 0.65 0.96 −0.03 0.80 0.67
Father's schooling 1.08 −0.08 1.59 2.17 0.57
Mother's schooling 1.08 0.33 1.99 0.10 2.61
Father rural −0.23 0.04 0.20 −1.83 1.20
Mother rural 2.46 0.13 0.74 4.07 1.15
Log hh size 13.82 17.98 19.20 13.95 13.87
Log cell size 4.16 13.65 5.83 4.75 1.28
Share of cell aged b5 1.59 3.04 1.29 2.13 1.03
Share of cell adults 9.25 8.99 14.39 5.47 8.62
Has formal schooling 9.02 1.27 11.02 6.92 9.76
Fostered 0.65 0.47 0.79 0.79 0.19
Fostered young −0.001 0.01 −0.02 −0.29 0.51
Age at ﬁrst marriage −0.07 0.98 −0.56 −0.55 0.91
Inherited land 0.60 −0.07 0.38 1.80 0.16
Inherited house 0.45 0.32 0.66 −0.15 0.92
Other inheritance 0.03 0.10 1.04 −0.47 −0.01
Rural 14.43 – – 15.25 14.88
Total share explained 46.50 27.90 41.50 47.00 46.20
Note: The sources do not add to the total share explained due to the omission of the share
of inequality due to department of residence.
343S. Lambert et al. / Journal of Development Economics 110 (2014) 327–344and does not appear to be an important channel for enhancing econom-
ic efﬁciency through transfers of ownership. Non-land inheritance,
schooling and parental characteristics (especially the mother's) appear
to play a far more important role.References
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